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TRANSFER PRICING CHALLENGES  
IN THE CLOUD 
ORLY MAZUR* 
Abstract: Cloud computing has fundamentally changed how companies oper-
ate. Companies have quickly adapted by moving their businesses to the cloud, 
but international tax standards have failed to follow suit. As a result, taxpayers 
and tax administrations confront significant tax challenges in applying outdated 
tax principles to this new environment. One particular area that raises perplex-
ing tax issues is the transfer pricing rules. The transfer pricing rules set forth the 
intercompany price a cloud service provider must charge an affiliate using its 
cloud services, which ultimately affects the determination of the jurisdiction in 
which the company’s profits are taxed. This Article argues that, due to the nature 
of the cloud, the current transfer pricing rules give U.S. multinational enterpris-
es substantial freedom to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions and avoid tax in 
the United States in a practice commonly referred to as base erosion and profit 
shifting, or “BEPS.” This type of aggressive international tax planning has be-
come a pressing problem worldwide that poses a serious risk to tax sovereignty, 
tax fairness, and the integrity of the corporate income tax. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) launched an action plan to 
address the BEPS problem, but the OECD’s work falls short of coming up with 
an innovative solution that will minimize the artificial shifting of profits abroad. 
In response, this Article recommends that, given the features of this new busi-
ness environment, an international tax reform solution that adopts formulary ap-
portionment or the profit-split methodology on a coordinated global basis would 
better address BEPS and minimize the undesirable policy results of our current 
transfer pricing rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
The buzzword “cloud computing” is more than a technological fad. As 
businesses from all industries increasingly move their operations to the 
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cloud, cloud computing has proven to be a key driver of electronic com-
merce and has already generated more than $150 billion in market sales 
annually.1 Cloud computing, which generally refers to the provision of in-
formation technology (“IT”) services in a virtual environment, allows a 
business to share computing resources, such as software, storage space, da-
tabases, IT personnel, hardware, and other infrastructure.2 It has become an 
attractive way of acquiring computing resources because it eliminates the 
need to manage captive IT infrastructure, provides scalable, on-demand ser-
vice, and offers substantial cost savings, efficiencies, and other benefits to 
businesses.3 Although this movement to the cloud provides businesses with 
substantial benefits, it also raises novel international tax issues that present 
challenges for both businesses and tax administrations. This Article focuses 
on the significant challenges that arise in applying the transfer pricing rules 
to multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) providing cloud services internally.4 
Every business that transacts internationally with related parties must 
take into account the transfer pricing rules. Transfer pricing is the price 
charged by one entity to a related entity for property or services.5 Therefore, 
where one or more members of an MNE group provide IT resources remotely 
to related members of the group, U.S. law, as well as the law of most other 
countries, dictates there must be an associated charge between the cloud ser-
vice provider and the affiliate that is using those cloud computing services.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Orly Mazur, Taxing the Cloud, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015); see Louis Columbus, 
Roundup of Cloud Computing Forecasts and Market Estimates, 2015, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014, 
2:57 PM), http://onforb.es/1uIoOiG [perma.cc/7V94-VWH2]; Press Release, Gartner, Gartner 
Says Cloud Computing Will Become the Bulk of New IT Spend by 2016 (Oct. 24, 2013), http://
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2613015 [perma.cc/FV2P-QEDJ]. Cloud computing is a rapidly 
growing business. Global business spending on cloud computing is forecast to amount to $235 billion 
by 2017. Patrick Seitz, Cloud Computing Sales to Triple by 2017, New Forecast Says, INVESTOR’S 
BUS. DAILY (Feb. 14, 2014), http://news.investors.com/technology-click/021414-690137-amzn-
goog-msft-battling-for-growing-cloud-market.htm [https://perma.cc/R62D-L7TF]. 
 2 See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. NO. 800-
145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (2011); Mazur, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
 3 Mazur, supra note 1, at 7–8; KPMG INT’L, TAX IN THE CLOUD: A BRIEFING FOR TAX DI-
RECTORS 5 (2012), http://www.kpmg-institutes.com/content/dam/kpmg/taxwatch/pdf/2012/tax-
cloud-briefing.pdf [perma.cc/WLP5-C3T8]. 
 4 A business can acquire cloud computing services in several ways: it can outsource this func-
tion to a third party, it can develop its own internal cloud platform to use in operating its business, 
or it can use some combination of the foregoing. Each method presents its own challenges. The 
focus of this Article is on the challenges presented to businesses that use an internal cloud plat-
form. For a discussion of the many tax challenges that third-party cloud vendors face, see Mazur, 
supra note 1, at 13–49. 
 5 See I.R.C. § 482 (2012) (codifying the procedure for allocating income and deductions 
among related entities). 
 6 See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (as amended in 2012) (setting forth general guidelines to be 
followed in order to clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent 
avoidance of taxes with respect to these transactions); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
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Transfer pricing is of significant concern to both taxpayers and tax 
administrations, because the transfer pricing rules affect how profits and 
losses are allocated among related entities in different jurisdictions that 
transact with each other. As a result, transfer pricing impacts the amount of 
tax revenue a particular taxing jurisdiction can collect, as well as the overall 
amount of after-tax profits the MNE group realizes.7 To minimize inter-
company price manipulation, the transfer pricing rules apply an arm’s-
length standard, which requires that the results of transactions between re-
lated taxpayers be consistent with the results that would have been realized 
if independent, unrelated parties had engaged in a comparable transaction 
under comparable circumstances.8 Cloud computing, however, exacerbates 
difficulties that already exist in determining an arm’s-length price for many 
intercompany transactions in our global economy.9 This Article evaluates 
these challenges in the context of cloud computing and argues that even 
though the current transfer pricing rules create significant compliance risks 
for companies that use an intercompany cloud in their operations, these 
rules also present significant tax planning opportunities.10 
In particular, with sufficient advance planning, companies can utilize 
the transfer pricing rules in a manner that will shift the MNE’s income from 
the home jurisdiction to alternate low- or no-tax jurisdictions without a cor-
                                                                                                                           
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRA-
TIONS 31–32 (2010) [hereinafter OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES] (providing a back-
ground discussion of the arm’s-length standard and setting forth guidelines for its application). 
 7 See I.R.C. § 482. 
 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)–(b) (describing the purpose and scope of the arm’s-length stand-
ard); Diane M. Ring, Risk-Shifting Within a Multinational Corporation: The Incoherence of the 
U.S. Tax Regime, 38 B.C. L. REV. 667, 714 (1997) (noting that parent-subsidiary transactions 
require the transfer pricing between the parent and subsidiary to conform to market principles). 
The arm’s-length standard is the internationally accepted standard underlying transfer pricing 
determinations. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND 
PROFIT SHIFTING 36 (2013), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/
addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page1 [perma.cc/UDZ7-LNHH] 
[hereinafter OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING] (explaining the arm’s-
length standard); OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at 31–32 (same); RICH-
ARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL 282 (9th ed. 2012) (identifying 
the arm’s-length standard as the “standard used globally to resolve transfer pricing disputes”); 
Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s Length Stand-
ard, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 737, 745 (2014) (noting that the arm’s-length standard has been the global 
standard since the 1920s). This Article focuses on the U.S. transfer pricing rules, which are similar 
in many respects to the transfer pricing rules of other countries. 
 9 See infra notes 22–112 and accompanying text (examining the challenges for MNEs trying 
to determine, plan for, and comply with their tax obligations under current law in the cloud con-
text). 
 10 See infra notes 113–185 and accompanying text (describing how MNEs can significantly 
reduce their worldwide tax liability by arranging their corporate structures to take advantage of the 
transfer pricing rules). 
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responding change to their business operations.11 By doing so, the MNE can 
lower its overall worldwide tax liability with the possibility of some income 
completely escaping taxation. This type of tax planning presents tremen-
dous challenges for governments worldwide as it artificially shifts profits 
away from the jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take 
place to jurisdictions with favorable tax regimes. The manipulation of the 
transfer pricing rules in this manner has become one of the largest contribu-
tors to base erosion and profit shifting, commonly referred to as “BEPS.”12 
Many people, from academics, policymakers, and governments to the 
public and media outlets, have taken notice of the severity of the BEPS 
problem and have called for reform of the international tax rules.13 As a re-
sult of this increased political pressure, and in response to the request of the 
G20—a group comprised of representatives of the world’s largest econo-
mies—the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) launched an action plan to implement the BEPS project (the 
“BEPS Action Plan”) in 2013.14 The BEPS Action Plan identifies fifteen 
action items that seek to address aggressive international tax planning in a 
coordinated and comprehensive manner by providing countries with “in-
struments that will better align rights to tax with economic activity.” 15 
Among the action items are actions to address the tax challenges of the digi-
                                                                                                                           
  11 See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 39. 
 12 Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 83 (2014) (observing that “[i]t is 
likely that the single largest contributor to the issues that triggered the attention to BEPS is the 
distortion created by implementation of transfer pricing valuation techniques by United States 
MNEs, supported by the courts’ endorsement of the arm’s length principle” (footnote omitted)); 
Ronald B. Davies et al., Knocking on Tax Haven’s Door: Multinational Firms and Transfer Pric-
ing, VOX (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.voxeu.org/print/58429 [perma.cc/B43W-SYRR] (noting that 
“[w]hile there are many ways in which firms can shift profits to low-tax locations, the use of in-
ternal, or transfer, prices is seen as one of the most significant”). 
 13 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING 10 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [perma.cc/4XB3-K4J5] [herein-
after OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING]; Pascal Saint-Amans & 
Raffaele Russo, What the BEPS Are We Talking About?, OECD FORUM (2013), http://www.oecd.
org/forum/what-the-beps-are-we-talking-about.htm [perma.cc/XL2L-W6FA]; Dhammika Dhar-
mapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework 1 (Coase-Sandor Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 703, 2014). 
 14 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 11; 
OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 10–14; Saint-Amans 
& Russo, supra note 13. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(“OECD”) initiative on BEPS first led the OECD to publish a major report in February 2013 on 
aggressive international tax planning. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFT-
ING, supra note 8, at 1. Then, in July 2013, the OECD published the BEPS Action Plan. OECD, 
ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 1. 
 15 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 11. In 
addition to identifying the actions needed to address BEPS, the BEPS Action Plan also sets dead-
lines to implement these actions, and identifies the resources needed and methodology to imple-
ment these actions. Id. 
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tal economy, as well as actions to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in 
line with value creation.16 Although cloud computing is not the focus of the 
action items addressing transfer pricing issues, intercompany cloud-based 
activities fundamentally involve the transfer pricing rules, which can affect 
the success of the BEPS Action Plan. 
Currently, no guidance exists on the application of the transfer pricing 
rules to cloud computing transactions. Instead, MNEs are left to apply the 
current rules to these transactions despite the significant challenges that do-
ing so creates. Furthermore, although the BEPS issue has received a lot of 
scholarly attention, the literature has not addressed the transfer pricing chal-
lenges created in the cloud computing context that need to be overcome to 
successfully resolve BEPS.17 
This Article seeks to fill the void in the literature by analyzing the 
transfer pricing compliance risks that arise for MNEs that use an intercom-
pany cloud in their operations and evaluating how these conditions create 
opportunities for MNEs to structure their cloud operations to minimize their 
tax liability. In assessing how the cloud business model contributes to 
BEPS, this Article seeks to contribute to the current discussion by present-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See id. at 14–15, 20–21. Action Item 1, together with the more general action items that will 
also address BEPS concerns in the context of the digital economy, seek to address the specificities 
that need to be taken into considerations in order to address the tax challenges of the digital econ-
omy. Id. at 14–15. Action Items 8 to 10 seek to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation. Id. at 20–21. In addition, Action Item 13 will re-examine transfer pricing 
documentation to develop rules to enhance transparency for tax administration. Id. at 23. Other 
action items set forth in the BEPS Action Plan include actions to neutralize the effects of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements (Action Item 2), actions to strengthen controlled foreign company rules 
(Action Item 3), actions to limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments 
(Action Item 4), actions to counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account 
transparency and substance (Action Item 5), actions to prevent treaty abuse (Action Item 6), ac-
tions to prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status (Action Item 7), actions 
to establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to address it (Ac-
tion Item 11), actions to require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements 
(Action Item 12), actions to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective (Action Item 14), 
and actions to develop a multilateral instrument (Action Item 15). Id. at 15–24. 
 17 See generally, e.g., Hugh J. Ault et al., Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for 
Reform, 68 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 275 (2014) (providing insight into the problems and proposed 
solutions associated with BEPS); Brauner, supra note 12 (reviewing the progress of the BEPS 
project and suggesting a paradigm shift from the current emphasis on competitiveness to a collab-
orative international tax regime); Arthur Cockfield, BEPS and Global Digital Taxation, 75 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 933 (2014) (discussing OECD BEPS reforms regarding cross-border income taxes); 
Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of 
the Empirical Literature, 35 FISCAL STUD. 421 (2014) (exploring the empirical literature associat-
ed with BEPS and providing a framework within which to understand the magnitude and implica-
tions of BEPS); Michael V. Sala, Breaking Down BEPS: Strategies, Reforms, and Planning Re-
sponses, 47 CONN. L. REV. 2 (2014) (setting forth strategies, reforms, and planning responses to 
the problem of BEPS); Wells & Lowell, supra note 8 (explaining the BEPS problem and evaluat-
ing potential reforms under consideration to solve the problem). 
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ing additional elements and concrete solutions that should be taken into ac-
count to better address the problems raised by our current transfer pricing 
regime. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I analyzes the difficulties that 
MNEs confront when trying to determine the arm’s-length price of inter-
company cloud computing transactions.18 Part I also discusses how cloud 
computing changes the economic activity of a business and the manner in 
which value is created, which contributes to these difficulties.19  In Part II, 
the Article discusses how the mainstream use of cloud computing has the 
potential to significantly contribute to BEPS by increasing the likelihood 
that this type of base erosion will accelerate.20  Specifically, Part II consid-
ers how BEPS strategies can manifest in the cloud computing context and 
argues that the fundamental features of cloud computing make some of the 
more difficult transfer pricing problems that already exist more common. 
Finally, Part III discusses the BEPS Action Plan and its recommendations 
for reform.21 Part III concludes that although the OECD’s work with respect 
to the BEPS Action Plan is commendable in that it seeks to find solutions to 
extremely difficult issues in an internationally coordinated manner, an in-
ternational tax reform solution that adopts formulary apportionment or the 
profit-split methodology on a coordinated global basis would better address 
BEPS and minimize the undesirable policy results of our current transfer 
pricing rules. 
I. TAX CHALLENGES TO COMPANIES 
The transfer pricing rules apply whenever companies in a controlled 
group transact with each other.22 Therefore, MNEs that move their opera-
tions to an internal cloud platform must apply the transfer pricing rules to 
determine an arm’s-length price for cloud computing transactions that occur 
within the MNE group. The international tax regime, including the transfer 
pricing rules, however, has not kept up with the technology evolution.23 
This has created challenges for MNEs trying to determine, plan for, and 
comply with their tax obligations under current law and may give rise to 
double taxation or non-taxation if taxpayers and tax administrations reach 
                                                                                                                            18 See infra notes 22–112 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 113–185 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 186–250 and accompanying text. 
 22 See I.R.C. § 482. 
 23  See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 5; 
Brauner, supra note 12, at 65, 70; EY Roundtable: Taxing the Cloud, J. INT’L TAX’N, Apr. 2014, at 
39, 40 [hereinafter EY Roundtable] (noting that international standards for taxation of the cloud 
are outdated). 
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different conclusions as to how the transfer pricing rules apply in the cloud 
context.  
This Part analyzes the tax compliance challenges that MNEs operating 
in the cloud face.24 Section A highlights the difficulties that exist in identi-
fying the best method to use as a benchmark to support the pricing of inter-
company cloud computing services rendered. These difficulties primarily 
arise because it is uncertain how existing law characterizes cloud-based 
transactions for transfer pricing purposes. Section B discusses some of the 
challenges in identifying the value-drivers in an intercompany cloud com-
puting transaction, which in turn lead to challenges in finding comparable 
transactions to use as a benchmark to price the cloud-based activities. Sec-
tion C considers how the nature of the cloud also makes it difficult to de-
termine the location of the value-drivers in a cloud-based business. As a 
result, MNEs operating in the cloud face difficulties in determining each 
group member’s economic contribution and the associated transfer pricing 
charge under the arm’s-length standard. 
A. Determination of the Best Method 
One of the difficulties that MNEs face in determining the arm’s-length 
price of cloud computing services is selecting which transfer pricing meth-
od to use.25 The U.S. transfer pricing regulations set forth specific methods 
to be used to determine the arm’s-length consideration for controlled trans-
actions.26 The methods available to evaluate a transaction under the arm’s-
length standard depend on the character of the transaction for tax purpos-
es.27 Therefore, from a transfer pricing perspective, the transaction’s charac-
terization is significant because it affects the determination of the best 
method to evaluate the pricing of the cloud computing services rendered.28 
Neither the U.S. transfer pricing rules nor any other regulatory guidance 
specifically addresses how to characterize cloud computing transactions.29 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 25–112 and accompanying text. 
 25 Orly Mazur, Tax Challenges in the Cloud, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2015). 
 26 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(b)(2), 1.482-2 (as amended in 2011). 
 27 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(b)(2), 1.482-2. Within the range of available methods, the trans-
fer pricing rules require the use of the best method: the method that, under the facts and circum-
stances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s-length result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(b), (d). 
 28  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1); Transfer Pricing Times: Volume X, Issue 4, DUFF & 
PHELPS (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.duffandphelps.com/expertise/publications/pages/ArticleDetail.
aspx?itemid=308&list=Articles [perma.cc/E72K-KQ4T] [hereinafter DUFF & PHELPS]. 
 29 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING THE 
TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1: 2015 FINAL REPORT 104 (2015) [here-
inafter OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY]; Sterling D. Jones, 
Transfer Pricing the Cloud: Tax Characterization of International Trade of Digital Goods and 
Services Between Related Parties, 6 ECON. NETWORKS EJOURNAL, no. 60, June 2014, at 1, 11, 
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Instead, companies must rely on traditional characterization principles to 
determine the character of the transaction. This results in several plausible 
characterizations. Because each characterization gives rise to a different 
range of available transfer pricing methods, this exposes MNEs to the risk 
that the tax administration will challenge whether the selected method is the 
best method for measuring the arm’s-length price. 
1. Transfer of a Tangible or Intangible Asset 
One possible characterization of the intercompany transfer of cloud 
computing resources is to treat it as the transfer of a tangible or intangible 
asset, depending on the quantity and quality of rights and burdens trans-
ferred in the transaction. The cloud computing transaction may be charac-
terized as such if the transaction falls within the scope of the software regu-
lations.30 To fall within the scope of the software regulations, a transaction 
generally must (1) relate to a computer program and (2) involve the transfer 
of a computer program, the provision of services for the development or 
modification of a computer program, or the provision of know-how with 
respect to a computer program.31 The definition of a computer program in-
cludes any media, user manuals, documentation, database, or similar items 
that are incidental to the operation of the computer program.32 Based on this 
language, a cloud arrangement that includes access to the company’s soft-
ware or associated databases, documentation, or similar items satisfies the 
definition of a computer program and meets the first requirement.33 
It is unclear whether a cloud transaction satisfies the second require-
ment because it is uncertain whether there has been a transfer of the com-
puter program.34 Before moving to the cloud, affiliates using the computer 
                                                                                                                           
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2460138 [perma.cc/Q9TG-TMXC] (noting the 
lack of guidance regarding cloud computing goods or services); Anne Welsh et al., Can Clouds 
Change Shapes? Transfer Pricing Considerations for Cloud Computing, 64 TAX NOTES INT’L 
147, 149 (2011). 
 30 Mazur, supra note 1, at 16; Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 149. The software regulations 
were promulgated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“the Treasury”) in 1998 to provide 
guidance in classifying international transactions involving computer programs, including for 
purposes of the transfer pricing rules. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(a)(1) (as amended in 1998); T.D. 
8785, 1998-42 I.R.B. 5 (1998). 
 31 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(a), (b)(1). For purposes of the software regulations, a “computer 
program” is “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in 
order to bring about a certain result” and includes databases or similar items if it is “incidental to 
the operation of the computer program.” Id. § 1.861-18(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1). 
 32 Id. § 1.861-18(a)(3). 
 33 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 17 (asserting that a cloud computing transaction relates to a 
computer program within the meaning of the software regulations). 
 34 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(a), (b)(1) (providing classifications of transactions involving 
computer programs). 
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program would either receive a physical copy of the software or would 
download an electronic copy to the computer where it was installed.35 But 
by moving to the cloud, the owner of the computer program no longer trans-
fers a physical or electronic copy of the computer program to the related 
entities for use.36 Instead, these entities merely access the software and data 
through the Internet. They also no longer bear the risks associated with 
maintenance of the software and the underlying hardware.37 Moreover, for 
purposes of calculating the production activities deduction under section 
199, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“the Treasury”) has taken the 
position that transactions that provide customers with access to online soft-
ware do not constitute a transfer unless customers can obtain a copy of the 
software either on a disk or through download from the Internet.38 Although 
this expresses the Treasury’s view in a different context, it illustrates that in 
certain circumstances online access to software may be treated differently 
than a transfer by physical disk or download for tax purposes. Thus, on the 
one hand, there is a strong argument that allowing affiliated entities to ac-
cess the company’s software in the cloud does not result in a “transfer” of 
the computer program. Under this line of reasoning, the transaction will 
likely be characterized as the provision of services.39 As further discussed 
below in subsection 2, specific transfer pricing methods are available to 
price intercompany services transactions.40 
On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that the software regula-
tions apply to cloud computing transactions. The software regulations specify 
that the rules apply “irrespective of the physical or electronic or other medi-
um used to effectuate the transfer of a computer program.”41 Thus, if the 
cloud activities merely constitute a mode of delivery of the computer pro-
gram, then the cloud computing activities may be within the scope of the 
software regulations. This is especially true in circumstances where sufficient 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Mazur, supra note 1, at 17 n.49. 
 36 Id. at 17; Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150. 
 37 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that a “cloud vendor bears a significant portion of 
the risk and retains most of the control over the computer program”). 
 38 See Treas. Reg. § 1.199-3(i)(6) (as amended in 2015); T.D. 9317, 2007-16 I.R.B. 2 (2007); 
Mazur, supra note 1, at 17 (distinguishing online access of software from physical access through 
a tangible medium); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150 (noting that the software regulations do not 
explicitly address situations in which a user may access software without first obtaining a physical 
copy of it). 
 39 See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 1, at 16–18 (explaining that if cloud computing falls outside 
the scope of Treasury Regulations section 1.861-18, then it could likely be characterized as a ser-
vice); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150 (same); KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7 (same); DUFF & 
PHELPS, supra note 28 (same). 
 40 See infra notes 46–69 and accompanying text.  
 41 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(g)(2); see Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150 (citing Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.861-18(g)(2)). 
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rights and burdens of ownership are transferred to the recipient of the cloud 
computing services.42 Under these circumstances, the transaction would not 
be characterized as the provision of services.43 Instead, the cloud computing 
transaction would be characterized in the same manner that the transaction 
would have been characterized before the move to the cloud: either as the 
transfer of a tangible asset or the transfer of an intangible asset.44 A different 
range of transfer pricing methods would be required to determine the arm’s-
length price of the transfer of tangible or intangible assets than the methods 
used to price the provision of services.45 
2. Provision of Services 
Another plausible, and arguably more likely, characterization is that 
cloud-based transactions are classified as the provision of services. As dis-
cussed above, there is a strong argument that in most cloud computing 
transactions there is no transfer of a computer program and therefore the 
transaction falls outside the scope of the software regulations.46 If the soft-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that in some cloud transactions a right may be 
transferred to a customer); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150 (asserting that it may be “inappro-
priate to focus on whether there is an actual transfer of a copy of the software provided the user 
has the right and ability to control the software applications”). 
 43 The software regulations only classify a transaction as services if the transaction involves 
“the provision of services for the development or modification of [a] computer program” or “the 
provision of know-how with respect to a computer program.” Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(a), (b)(1). 
Cloud-based services often times do not involve the development or modification of a computer 
program or the provision of know-how with respect to a computer program. Mazur, supra note 1, 
at 18 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(a), (b)(1)). 
 44 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 16–18 (exploring how to characterize income derived from 
cloud transactions); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 149–50 (noting that if this approach is followed 
“the movement to the cloud would not change the pre-cloud analysis of the transactions as trans-
fers of tangible goods or intangibles”). 
 45 If the transaction is characterized as the transfer of a copyright-protected article, which 
from a transfer pricing perspective is treated as the transfer of a tangible asset, then the transfer 
pricing rules provide that the arm’s-length amount charged must be determined under the compa-
rable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, the cost plus method, the comparable 
profits method, the profit split method, or an unspecified method that is consistent with these 
methods. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (as amended in 1995); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 149 n.14. 
If the transaction is characterized as the transfer of a copyright, which from a transfer pricing 
perspective is likely treated as the transfer of an intangible asset, then the transfer pricing rules 
provide that the arm’s-length amount charged must be determined under the comparable uncon-
trolled transaction method, the comparable profits method, the profit split method, or an unspeci-
fied method that is consistent with these methods. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a) (as amended in 2011); 
Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 149–50 n.14. 
 46 See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that it is unclear whether a cloud computing 
transaction involves the transfer of a computer program); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 150 (ex-
plaining that “the absence of an actual transfer of the software would essentially remove the trans-
actions from the scope of the software regulations”); KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7 (“In many, if 
not most [c]loud transactions, there will be no such transfer [of a computer program] . . . .”); DUFF 
& PHELPS, supra note 28 (noting that because cloud computing does not involve an actual transfer 
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ware regulations do not apply, then under traditional characterization prin-
ciples, the transaction’s characterization depends to a large extent on wheth-
er a transfer of property rights exist.47 In this situation, “[i]f no property 
right exists either in form or in substance, the transaction is generally char-
acterized as the provision of services.”48 
Under current case law, this determination depends to a large extent on 
which party bears the risk with respect to the transaction and which party 
retains control over how the transaction is carried out.49 Although this de-
pends on the particular facts and circumstances of the cloud arrangement, in 
many cloud computing transactions the entity acting as the cloud service 
provider bears substantial risk of loss and retains control and possession 
over the software, applications, and underlying infrastructure.50 Under these 
circumstances, the cloud service provider is not giving up any property 
rights in the software, applications, or infrastructure used in connection with 
the cloud computing transaction.51 Thus, moving to the cloud may cause 
intercompany cloud computing transactions to be treated as services under 
the U.S. transfer pricing rules.52 
If cloud computing transactions are treated as the intercompany provi-
sion of services, then the transfer pricing rules require the arm’s-length 
amount charged to be determined under one of the following methods: (1) 
the services cost method (“SCM”), (2) the comparable uncontrolled services 
price method, (3) the gross services margin method, (4) the cost of services 
                                                                                                                           
of software, it can be argued that cloud computing transactions fall outside the scope of the soft-
ware regulations); see also supra notes 25–78 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulties 
MNEs face in selecting which transfer pricing method to use to determine the arm’s-length price 
of cloud computing services). 
 47 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 23; KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7. 
 48 Mazur, supra note 1, at 23; see, e.g., Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66, 72 (Ct. Cl. 
1957) (characterizing an employee’s rights as services income because the employee’s rights de-
rive from services to the employer and not from any property that the employee owns); Boulez v. 
Comm’r, 83 T.C. 584, 595 (1984) (holding that a conductor did not have a property right in a 
recording because no copyright existed and thus the transaction to make a recording under the 
conductor’s direction was a provision of services). 
 49 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that the determination for whether a cloud customer 
possesses any property rights generally requires an analysis of risk and control); see also Rev. Rul. 
74-555, 1974-2 C.B. 202 (illustrating how an author may characterize certain income derived from 
a work as royalties rather than compensation for services if the publisher lacks control over the 
work); Richard H. Lilley Jr., Cloud Computing: Permanent Establishment and Its Implications for 
International Taxation, TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.: SPECIAL REP. (July 10, 2014) (list-
ing factors relevant in characterizing an arrangement as a service or a lease, which include risk 
with respect to the transaction and control over the property). 
 50 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 24 (observing that in many cloud transactions the cloud vendor 
bears the risk of loss and retains significant control). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 147 (asserting that moving to the cloud may allow cloud 
transactions to be treated as the provision of services). 
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plus method, (5) the comparable profits method, (6) the profit split method, 
or (7) unspecified methods applied consistently with the other methods.53 
Although most of these methods are conceptually the same as the methods 
used to price intercompany transfers of tangible and intangible assets, if the 
MNE group chooses to use the SCM, this can result in a substantially dif-
ferent arm’s-length price for the cloud-based transactions.54 
The SCM is a cost safe harbor that permits certain non-integral ser-
vices to be priced by reference to the total services cost without any 
markup.55 The SCM is not available for pricing the transfer of tangible or 
intangible assets. To qualify for this method, several requirements must be 
met. First, the intercompany service must meet the definition of a specified 
covered service, as identified by the IRS Commissioner through revenue 
procedure, or alternatively, as low margin covered services.56 The types of 
services that qualify are support services that are common among taxpayers 
across industry segments and generally do not involve a significant arm’s-
length markup on total service costs.57 For instance, supporting company-
wide computer systems, maintaining and repairing IT systems, providing 
technical assistance to users of computer systems and other IT devices, 
maintaining and testing computer databases, supporting, maintaining and 
monitoring an organization’s existing network system, and similar IT activi-
ties may qualify for the SCM. These types of activities, however, cannot 
qualify for the SCM to the extent they include analyzing user needs or de-
veloping hardware or software solutions unless the activities constitute low 
margin services.58 A covered service activity will also not qualify unless the 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(a) (as amended in 2011). 
 54 See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 149–51 (explaining how even though many of the meth-
ods used to price intercompany services, the intercompany transfer of tangible goods, and the 
intercompany transfer of intangible goods may be conceptually the same, the application of the 
rules in these different contexts may vary significantly). 
 55 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b). 
 56 Id. § 1.482-9(b)(2)–(3). Low margin covered services are intercompany services transac-
tions for which the median comparable markup on total services costs is less than or equal to 7%. 
Id. § 1.482-9(b)(3)(ii). 
 57 Id. § 1.482-9(b)(3)(i). Other types of support services that qualify are payroll activities, 
activities related to processing unemployment, disability and workers compensation premiums, 
activities related to working with accounts receivable and accounts payable, general administrative 
activities, corporate and public relations activities, coordinating meetings and travel, accounting 
and auditing activities, activities related to complying with the company’s tax obligations, health, 
safety, environmental, and regulatory affairs activities, budgeting, treasury activities, statistical 
assistance, staffing and recruiting, training and employee development, benefits, legal services, 
insurance claims management, and purchasing. Rev. Proc. 2007-13, 2007-3 I.R.B. 295. 
 58 Rev. Proc. 2007-13, 2007-3 I.R.B. 295. Activities that do not qualify for the SCM include 
developing systems integration, designing websites, writing computer programs, modifying gen-
eral applications software, or recommending the purchase of commercially available hardware or 
software. Id. 
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taxpayer can reasonably conclude, in its business judgment, that “the ser-
vice does not contribute significantly to key competitive advantages, core 
capabilities, or fundamental risks of success or failure in one or more trades 
or businesses of the controlled group.”59 Additionally, to be eligible to be 
priced under the SCM, the intercompany service cannot consist of an ex-
cluded activity, such as production, distribution, or research and develop-
ment, and adequate books and records must be maintained.60 
Based on the particular facts and circumstances of the cloud arrange-
ment, it is possible that in certain situations the intercompany provision of 
cloud services will qualify for the SCM. Consider the following example. 
USCo., a U.S. corporation, develops proprietary software that it maintains 
and hosts on its own computer infrastructure and which it allows XCo., a 
related foreign corporation, to access remotely.61 Assuming that the soft-
ware is an enterprise resource planning system that is used by the MNE 
group to maintain data relating to accounts payable and receivable, it is pos-
sible that this non-customer-facing application does not contribute signifi-
cantly to the fundamental risks of the success of the business. 62  Thus, 
USCo. may be eligible to charge these services to XCo. using the SCM be-
cause activities related to working with accounts receivable and accounts 
payable are specified as covered services.63 This would include the cost of 
maintaining the computer infrastructure and networks that are being used to 
host the software and related data, as well as any IT support that USCo. 
provides to XCo. But any services performed by USCo.’s IT personnel that 
relate to modifying or developing the software or hardware system will not 
be eligible for the SCM and will need to be evaluated separately using one 
of the other transfer pricing methods available for pricing intercompany 
services.64 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(2), (5) (prohibiting application of the services cost method to 
services that fall under the business judgment rule). 
 60 Id. § 1.482-9(b)(2), (4), (6). Even though these types of activities are excluded and do not 
qualify for the SCM, a cloud-based activity that involves the use of software that performs these 
types of activities does not necessarily constitute an excluded activity. Welsh et al., supra note 29, 
at 151 (distinguishing excluded activities from the supply of software packages that facilitate 
those activities). Instead, the provision of a service via the cloud should be analyzed based on the 
nature of the underlying service being provided. Id. 
 61 This modified example is based on the example set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(8) ex. 
12. 
 62 See id. (providing an example of a business situation where certain services would not 
contribute to the risks of success of a business). 
 63 See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 151–52 (detailing activities that are considered covered 
services within the meaning of Revenue Procedure 2007-13). 
 64 An exception exists if these activities constitute low margin services. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
9(b)(2)–(3), (8) ex. 12. Whether the exception exists depends on which companies the taxpayer 
identifies as comparable companies for the purposes of determining a benchmark. Welsh et al., 
supra note 29, at 152. 
656 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:643 
To the extent the SCM is available, this would generally be beneficial 
to the MNE group. Pursuant to the SCM, USCo. would charge XCo. the 
costs of rendering the eligible cloud computing services without any profit 
markup.65 If multiple members of the controlled group also receive the ben-
efit of these services, then those costs would be allocated among those 
members based on the relative benefits that each receives.66 Because the 
SCM is relatively a much simpler method than the other methods available 
to price intercompany services, this would minimize the MNE group’s 
compliance burdens in pricing the intercompany services. Use of the SCM, 
as opposed to the other available transfer pricing methods, might also bene-
fit the MNE group because the arm’s-length consideration paid to USCo. 
will likely be smaller under the SCM than the other available transfer pric-
ing methods due to the fact that USCo. does not have to increase the cost it 
charges its affiliates by any profit markup. Thus, a smaller amount of the 
MNE group’s profits would be allocated to the United States, a high tax 
jurisdiction, which may minimize the overall tax liability of the MNE 
group. 
Furthermore, if the cloud computing transaction qualifies for the SCM, 
then such services may also be the subject of a shared services arrangement 
(“SSA”) between the parties using and providing the cloud services.67 Un-
der an SSA, the arm’s-length charge to each participant for the services is 
the participant’s share of the total services costs allocated to the participant 
based on its respective share of the reasonably anticipated benefits from the 
services.68 If the taxpayer reasonably concludes that the SSA allocates costs 
for these services on a basis that most reliably reflects the participants’ re-
spective shares of the reasonably anticipated benefits attributable to such 
services, then the taxpayer may reduce its compliance risks because the tax 
administration may not adjust the basis used for the allocation.69 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(1) (codifying the services cost method). 
 66 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(k) (noting that “costs must be allocated among the portions of 
the activity performed for the benefit of the first mentioned recipient and such other members of 
the controlled group”). Any reasonable method may be used to allocate the costs of providing the 
intercompany service. Id. As some commentators have noted, this may present difficulties in find-
ing an appropriate basis by which to allocate costs because traditional stationary metrics may no 
longer be a reliable measurement. E.g., Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152. 
 67 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(7) (providing guidance on what constitutes a shared services 
arrangement); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152 (describing the arm’s-length charge between 
participants in a shared services agreement). 
 68 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(7); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152. 
 69 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(b)(7). However, cloud computing transactions may also involve the 
development or modification of software, which do not qualify as covered services and therefore 
are ineligible for treatment under an SSA. Id.; Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152–53. If the parties 
are treated as jointly developing software, then the service costs related to development would 
likely be treated as a cost-sharing arrangement, instead of an SSA pursuant to the U.S. transfer 
pricing rules. Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152–53. 
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3. Integrated Transaction 
It is also possible that a cloud-based transaction may be characterized 
as the provision of services but that elements of the transaction will be 
characterized as the transfer of a tangible or intangible asset.70 This charac-
terization is plausible, because pursuant to the transfer pricing rules, differ-
ent transfer pricing methods may be applied to an interrelated transaction if 
such transaction is most reliably evaluated on a separate basis.71 Given the 
multiple services that an entity operating as a cloud service provider may 
offer to its affiliates—some of which are similar to the transfer of a comput-
er program whereas others are in the nature of true services—a cloud com-
puting transaction may need to be analyzed as two separate transactions for 
purposes of determining the appropriate transfer price.72 If this is the appro-
priate characterization for transfer pricing purposes, then different transfer 
pricing methods may apply to the separate elements of the transaction, 
which may result in a different arm’s-length consideration.73 
In summary, cloud computing transactions do not neatly fall within 
any of the traditional tax classifications. This creates compliance challenges 
for MNEs using an intercompany cloud. It is currently unclear whether 
cloud computing transactions involve the transfer of a computer program 
under existing tax law. As a result, it is possible that transacting in the cloud 
may change a transaction’s characterization from the transfer of a tangible 
or intangible asset to the provision of services. 74 The flexible nature of 
cloud computing also contributes to the difficulties in characterizing cloud-
based activities, because companies may use different cloud business mod-
els to structure their operations. Thus, there is no simple way to characterize 
cloud computing transactions and each of the characterizations discussed 
above represent plausible alternatives. Because the appropriate transfer 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that software regulations could apply only to a por-
tion of the cloud transaction); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152 (providing an example of when a 
single activity may be divided and evaluated separately under different methods). 
 71 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2)(ii) (allowing for application of different methods to interrelat-
ed transactions); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(m)(4) (stating that a transaction may be evaluated separately 
when doing so provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s-length result). But note that if the 
cloud computing transactions, taken as a whole, are so interrelated that consideration of multiple 
transactions as an integrated transaction is the most reliable means of determining the arm’s-length 
consideration for the intercompany transactions, then it may be possible to evaluate the transactions 
together as either an intercompany service or the intercompany transfer of assets. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.482-1(f)(2) (allowing for aggregation of transactions); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(m)(4). 
 72 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(m)(4); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152 (discussing the coordi-
nation provision contained in Treasury Regulations section 1.482-9). 
 73 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(2)(ii). 
 74 See DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 28 (noting that because cloud computing does not involve 
actual transfers of software, it could be argued that cloud computing instead could be character-
ized as a service). 
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pricing methodology used to test the transaction is dependent on the trans-
action’s characterization, this determination will significantly impact the 
benchmarking analysis required to support the intragroup transaction as 
arm’s-length.75 Moreover, within the range of available methods, it is not 
always clear which method is the “best method.”76 MNEs and tax administra-
tions may disagree as to which method provides the most reliable measure of 
an arm’s-length result.77 To further complicate matters, as the cloud compu-
ting business model continues to evolve, the possible classification of the 
transaction is also likely to change.78 
B. Identifying the Value-Drivers 
Identifying the value-drivers of an MNE group is a critical component 
in determining the arm’s-length consideration for an intercompany transac-
tion. Pursuant to the transfer pricing rules, the arm’s-length price will gen-
erally be determined “by reference to the results of comparable transactions 
under comparable circumstances.”79 In order to make this determination, an 
MNE must first delineate each activity performed that contributes to the 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7 (asserting that “the correct classification of the under-
lying transaction is fundamental to the tax treatment”); DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 28 (discussing 
the implications stemming from the characterization of cloud transactions). To minimize compli-
ance risks and manage these uncertainties, MNEs should strategically structure their cloud opera-
tions and intercompany contracts prior to beginning operations in a manner that enables them to 
define and document the various intercompany transactions in the supply chain and support their 
transfer pricing methodology. See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 42–43. 
76 Laurie Dicker, How Is Your Cloud Taxable: New Transfer Pricing Analysis for New Busi-
ness Paradigms, ALVAREZ & MARSAL HOLDINGS, LLC (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.alvarezand
marsal.com/how-your-cloud-taxable-new-transfer-pricing-analysis-new-business-paradigms [perma.
cc/S76S-B666] [hereinafter ALVAREZ & MARSAL]. 
 77 Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (providing factors to be used in determining whether a 
controlled transaction produces an arm’s-length result). This determination is generally made by 
comparing the results of the intercompany transaction to the results realized by independent tax-
payers in a comparable transaction under comparable circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d). 
 78 It is likely that businesses will move away from pure cloud transactions that currently do 
not involve the transfer of any property and move to cloud transactions that involve the transfer of 
significant property rights, such as control over the software, perpetual rights to use the software 
even after payments terminate, or risk of loss associated with the software. See Franck Llinas et 
al., Cloud Activities: Check Your Tax Forecasts, TRANSFER PRICING INT’L J., Dec. 20, 2013, at 1, 
1; KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 7 (describing a continuum from “pure cloud transactions where 
no property is transferred through to transactions where property is transferred together with per-
petual rights to use once payments cease”). Moreover, another cloud-based business model is 
already beginning to develop, wherein the cloud service provider delivers an entire business pro-
cess to an affiliate rather than merely access to software, infrastructure, or computing capacity. 
See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 153 (discussing “business process as a service” as a potential 
direction in which cloud computing may be headed). 
 79 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
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overall profit of the MNE group.80 These activities are the intercompany 
transactions that need to be evaluated for transfer pricing purposes. This 
analysis requires an evaluation of the functions performed by the parties, 
the assets used, the risks assumed, and the other economically relevant 
characteristics of the transaction and the overall business operations of the 
MNE group.81 At the same time, the cloud business model raises fundamen-
tal questions regarding how value is added, which creates difficulties in iso-
lating the value-drivers, and therefore the relevant comparables, for an 
MNE group operating in the cloud.82 
In particular, the flexible and integrated nature of the cloud creates 
numerous possibilities as to where the value of the cloud-based business 
resides.83 Currently, no framework exists for determining which possibili-
ties are right and which are wrong.84 Consider, for example, a multinational 
media networking company, Media Co., that provides customers with 
online access to media content. The MNE has subsidiaries operating domes-
tically and abroad that provide streaming services to customers in exchange 
for a monthly subscription fee. In providing these streaming services, the 
subsidiaries use proprietary software developed and owned by Media Co. 
that is hosted on Media Co.’s computer infrastructure. To determine the ap-
propriate transfer prices for its intercompany transactions, the MNE group 
needs to identify the transactions that generate value, and therefore profit, 
for the MNE group. But what are all the value-drivers in the MNE’s global 
supply chain that will impact whether the business succeeds? 
One potential value-driver is the server infrastructure that hosts the 
software, data, and related functionality. It is possible, but not certain, that 
operating a web server itself can be treated as engaging in an economically 
significant activity, in which case a value needs to be placed on that web 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See DAVID E. HARDESTY, Electronic Commerce Services, in ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: 
TAXATION AND PLANNING ¶ 13A.02, at 8–9 (2016) (illustrating by example the process for identi-
fying each activity performed that contributes to the overall profit of a MNE). 
 81 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d) (listing factors relevant to determining the comparability of 
transactions). 
 82 See Jones, supra note 29, at 10 (noting that “taxing authorities as well as MNEs have fun-
damental questions regarding how value is added, where profits are generated, and how these 
questions fit within the existing framework”); Lilley, supra note 49 (emphasizing the obstacles 
involved in determining value-drivers in a cloud transaction); ALVAREZ & MARSAL, supra note 
76 (observing that “businesses are finding inventive new services to offer and non-traditional new 
ways to derive value from such services”). 
 83 See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 43 (describing the challenge in trying to determine 
where value-drivers actually sit); Lilley, supra note 49 (noting how focusing on the physical loca-
tion of a cloud transaction may result in a failure to comprehensively determine the relevant value 
drivers involved). 
 84 EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 43. 
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server operation.85 For instance, the IT infrastructure that the MNE uses 
adds value to the company, because it affects the reliability, speed, and se-
curity of the system, as well as the quality of the operation of the software 
and therefore the quality of the streaming services that customers ultimately 
receive.86 But treating the IT hardware, such as servers, as a significant val-
ue-driver creates uncertainties in determining how to value this economic 
activity. In particular, issues arise because many cloud computing services 
can be provided without any people or with very few people involved.87 
This can create difficulties because current law has traditionally viewed 
human individuals as service providers and valued the services based on the 
activities such personnel perform.88 When complex virtual networks and 
machines, rather than human individuals, provide important components of 
the supply chain, this challenges how to attribute value to the performance 
of these services.89 
If the server activities are treated as a service provider with respect to 
the cloud computing services, then the activities of an independent cloud 
vendor may serve as a benchmark for the intercompany price if considered 
comparable to Media Co.’s intercompany transactions.90 But in evaluating 
the comparability of the unrelated cloud services, several challenges arise.91 
In particular, the nature of the services provided may vary significantly 
among cloud service providers, which may challenge an MNE’s ability to 
make necessary comparability adjustments. For instance, in the example 
above, the servers provide multiple services, such as hosting the software, 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 1–2 (recognizing that operating a web server by itself can 
constitute a business activity). 
 86 See IRS, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at 9 
(2006) (defining the term “permanent establishment” in Article 5(1)); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPI-
TAL 26 (2010) (same); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTI-
CLES OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION 110–11 (2010) (recognizing that the server on which a 
web site is stored is a piece of equipment having a physical location and thus may constitute a 
“fixed place of business”); HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 2 (illustrating how to price the use of a 
web server in the context of e-commerce); EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 44–45 (discussing 
how to attribute value to a web server); Mazur, supra note 1, at 33–34, 40–44 (exploring how 
current law may analyze the use of a server for determining whether it creates a taxable presence). 
 87 See DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 28 (noting that cloud computing requires minimal man-
agement effort and service provider interaction). 
 88 See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 41 (asserting that tax law has historically focused on 
a finding a human being who actually renders or provides a service). 
 89 See id. 
 90 See HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 3 (illustrating in the context of e-commerce how the 
activities of an independent vendor may serve as a benchmark for an intercompany price). 
 91 Evaluating the comparability of the unrelated cloud services requires consideration of all 
the factors that could affect prices or profits in arm’s-length dealings. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(d). Such factors include functions, contractual terms, risks, economic conditions, and property 
or services. Id. 
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storing data, and providing other relevant functionality that is essential to 
the success of the business. Other independent cloud vendors may bundle a 
variety of different services into the basic service agreement provided to 
unrelated customers, and oftentimes it may be difficult to separately identify 
the charges for the various functions the servers provide.92 In addition, the 
level and type of risk that each cloud vendor retains may vary significantly 
between cloud services providers, which also affects the degree of compa-
rability between intercompany cloud services and unrelated cloud ser-
vices.93 Specifically, some cloud vendors may retain more risk with respect 
to technological issues whereas others may only take on risk with respect to 
a certain level of service, such as guaranteeing only a certain quality or 
speed.94 To the extent that risks are not comparable, pricing adjustments 
need to be made. 
Having a server as a value-driver is also problematic because cloud 
vendors often use mirror servers.95 Mirror servers are servers located in dif-
ferent locations that duplicate the software and data stored on core servers 
and perform identical functions for security and efficiency purposes.96 Thus, 
different servers, potentially located in different countries, may be utilized 
at different times throughout the day.97 This creates significant uncertainties 
in determining how much profit to allocate to the server activity and to each 
server. 
Another possible value-driver in the cloud computing transaction de-
scribed above is the proprietary software technology developed by Media 
Co. Even pre-cloud, this type of intangible property has been a significant 
source of transfer pricing controversies because of the difficulties in finding 
a comparable transaction. Separately, the technology developed to provide 
the particular cloud computing services, which ensures the operation of the 
                                                                                                                           
 92 HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 3. 
 93 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii) (detailing the role of risk in determining the degree of 
comparability between two transactions). 
 94 See HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 3 (illustrating how the level and type of risk is deter-
mined in the context of a web server used in e-commerce). 
 95 See Llinas et al., supra note 78, at 3 (noting that “it is common for server traffic to be ‘load 
balanced’ and may occur in different jurisdictions at different times of the commercial day”); 
Mazur, supra note 1, at 11 (describing “mirror servers” and how they make it difficult to deter-
mine when a country has jurisdiction to tax cloud income). See Kenji E. Kushida et al., Diffusing 
the Cloud: Cloud Computing and Implications for Public Policy, 11 J. INDUSTRY COMPETITION & 
TRADE 209, 215–23 (2011) (describing how cloud computing works). 
 96 HARDESTY, supra note 80, at 1; Mazur, supra note 1, at 11. 
 97 See Lilley, supra note 49 (noting the use by cloud vendors of redundant and backup sys-
tems residing in multiple jurisdictions); Llinas et al., supra note 78, at 3 (illustrating how a cloud 
provider may have IT servers in more than one country). 
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cloud-based business, is another intangible value-driver.98 In addition, there 
may be other intangibles involved that add value to the operation of the 
MNE’s business, such as the content the cloud vendor hosts on its servers 
that utilize software technology provided through the cloud, any marketing 
intangibles, customer relationships, as well as a business trademark or trade 
name.99 As with other intangibles, due to the unique nature of these types of 
assets, it is often difficult to find unrelated transactions that are sufficiently 
comparable. 
Other economically significant activities in the cloud context often in-
clude the activities of personnel managing and maintaining the IT infra-
structure, the personnel developing or managing the intellectual property, 
and the marketing department of the subsidiaries. Even though comparable 
transactions likely exist for these types of activities, it may nevertheless be 
difficult to assess the economic contribution of these activities due to the 
integrated nature of the cloud. Multiple related entities often combine their 
efforts to provide cloud offerings, and in some circumstances, these func-
tions become so integrated that it may be difficult to separate them out for 
purposes of finding a comparable transaction as a benchmark to price the 
transaction.100 
In summary, cloud computing contributes to the overall value of the 
company through many inputs, such as the company’s proprietary software, 
the performance, reliability, speed, and security of the IT infrastructure, the 
personnel managing and maintaining the IT infrastructure, the personnel 
developing or managing the intellectual property, the content provided 
through the cloud, the marketing department, and other intangibles. These 
numerous components that make up the cloud offering, together with the 
integrated nature of the cloud, create challenges in separately identifying 
and valuing each value-driver and determining which value-driver or driv-
ers should govern the transfer pricing results. Thus, as the cloud becomes a 
fundamental component in the supply chain of many organizations, these 
uncertainties will likely give rise to disputes between taxpayers and tax ad-
ministrations.101 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 44 (distinguishing income attributable to server 
equipment from income attributable to the services, platforms, and content running on that equip-
ment). 
 99 See id. at 44, 46. 
 100 See ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROF-
IT SHIFTING PROJECT, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, AC-
TIONS 8–10—2015 FINAL REPORTS 47 (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING 
OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION] (explaining how MNE group synergies create comparability 
issues). 
 101 See Mazur, supra note 25, at 6 (noting how tax authorities and taxpayers may disagree as 
to the value-drivers underlying transfer pricing results); ALVAREZ & MARSAL, supra note 76, at 1 
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C. Locating the Value-Drivers 
Moreover, even if these value-drivers can be identified and valued, in-
tercompany cloud computing, like other global value chains, also presents 
challenges to traditional notions of determining which entity is providing 
this additional value. Because the tax system seeks to tax profits generated 
within a defined jurisdiction, identifying where the value-driver is located 
affects the jurisdiction in which those profits are taxed and ultimately af-
fects the overall tax liability of the MNE.102 Failure to correctly identify the 
taxable jurisdiction may result in double taxation of profits to MNEs if their 
arm’s-length price is challenged. This may be especially problematic in the 
cloud computing context. 
Cloud computing often results in substantial cost savings to business-
es, because by eliminating the need for each entity to have its own expen-
sive hardware, software, and IT support team to manage the hardware and 
assist with software installation and maintenance, cloud computing reduces 
the capital expenditures for the MNE group, reduces energy consumption 
costs, and reduces the costs of human personnel required to maintain and 
operate local data centers.103 The elastic, on-demand nature of cloud com-
puting also eliminates excess capacity in data storage and computing re-
sources.104 Because the cloud resources can be located anywhere, MNEs are 
also able to integrate IT functions in different jurisdictions, which enables 
them to further reduce certain costs through synergies that take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope.105 In addition, the cloud environment often 
                                                                                                                           
(“The cloud is not always clear, and this lack of clarity is bound to create confusion and disagree-
ments between taxpayers and taxing authorities . . . .”). 
 102 See Aleksandra Bal, Tax Implications of Cloud Computing—How Real Taxes Fit into Virtual 
Clouds, 66 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 335, 336 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2438466 [perma.cc/HAZ3-
PRWJ] (explaining the importance of determining the physical location of an economic activity in 
the context of tax systems and how the cloud complicates this determination); RANDY FREE & ALEX 
BAULF, GRANT THORNTON, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX CHALLENGES OF SOFT-
WARE AS A SERVICE AND CLOUD COMPUTING (2011), http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/
GTCom/Technology/Techdashboard/International%20tax%20challenges%20of%20SaaS.pdf [perma.
cc/YN5D-LVAJ] (noting the difficulties in determining where in the cloud a transaction takes place). 
 103 See Lilley, supra note 49 (asserting that by using the cloud “businesses are able to out-
source their IT functions in a flexible and scalable way, gain efficiency and reduce operational 
costs”); Mazur, supra note 1, at 9 (describing ways in which a business’s transition to the cloud 
can decrease its operating costs); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152 (describing ways through 
which cloud computing reduces business costs); FREE & BAULF, supra note 102 (discussing how 
cloud computing is changing business). 
 104 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2 (listing “rapid elasticity” and “on-demand self-
service” as essential characteristics of cloud computing); Mazur, supra note 1, at 9 (noting the 
opportunity for increased scalability due to the on-demand nature of cloud computing); Welsh et 
al., supra note 29, at 148, 153 (citing various benefits of the cloud, including increased elasticity). 
 105 Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking the Source of the Arm’s-Length Transfer Pricing Problem, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 425, 431 (2013). 
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enables affiliates to collaborate in a manner that results in business optimi-
zation and innovation, which may contribute to group synergies that create 
additional value for the MNE group. As a result, a significant challenge that 
arises from a transfer pricing standpoint in the cloud environment is that it 
is not immediately clear where the cost savings realized from moving to the 
cloud should accrue.106 
Applying the arm’s-length standard to determine the transfer price for an 
intercompany cloud computing transaction in this environment is challenging. 
Specifically, compliance challenges arise, because these advantages are often 
not typical of comparable independent companies, thereby making it diffi-
cult to find independent companies that have similar savings and benefits to 
use as a benchmark for allocating these additional profits.107 Thus, applying 
the transfer pricing rules to this type of transaction may not necessarily pro-
vide an arm’s-length result. 
Instead, a facts and circumstances analysis that takes into account the 
functions, assets, and risks of all the relevant associated enterprises would 
need to be used to determine each member’s contribution to the creation of 
this additional value. Given the integrated nature of many cloud offerings, 
accurately making this determination is challenging. Issues arise because 
multiple related entities often provide the various elements of the cloud 
computing service.108 As a result, it is unclear which entity is contributing 
to the creation of the MNE group’s synergies, because it may not be clear 
which entities are providing the cloud infrastructure, which entities are 
providing the personnel that support the business, which entities are provid-
ing services, and where the intellectual property is owned, developed, and 
managed.109 Moreover, given the global fluidity of the cloud, this challenge 
is further exacerbated because cloud transactions often change locations 
throughout the day and may simultaneously occur in numerous jurisdictions 
for reasons such as load-balancing and security precautions.110 
It may also be difficult to determine the amount of each entity’s contri-
bution to the residual profits of the MNE group, because the multiple value-
drivers of the cloud business, which may be developed, managed, and per-
formed in different areas and by different entities, often work together to 
                                                                                                                           
 106 EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 64; Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 147. 
 107 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra 
note 100, at 47 (asserting that MNE groups may benefit from synergies not available to similarly 
situated independent enterprises). 
 108 See Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 750–52 (stressing the difficulties inherent in apply-
ing a one-sided transfer pricing methodology to residual profits). 
 109 EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 43. 
 110 See FREE & BAULF, supra note 102, at 2 (“For many reasons, such as security concerns 
and speed of accessibility, the location of the transaction may move through the cloud as the data-
bases replicate to follow time zones.”). 
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create the cost savings, residual profits, and group synergies. As one com-
mentary appropriately observed, these “residual profits [that] exist[] within 
the MNE group [can]not be explained by the routine functions performed 
by any single affiliate.”111 Thus, the cloud environment exacerbates the dif-
ficulties in determining each related member’s contribution and associated 
transfer pricing charge.112 
II. TAX CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENTS 
Despite the tax compliance risks that exist for MNEs operating in the 
cloud, companies can transform many of these uncertainties into tax oppor-
tunities. With advance planning, MNEs can significantly reduce their over-
all worldwide tax liability by arranging their corporate structures to take 
advantage of the transfer pricing rules. In particular, by moving profits to 
where they are subject to lower tax rates and moving expenses to where 
they are deducted at higher rates, an MNE may achieve double non-taxation 
or less than single taxation.113 Although legal, this type of aggressive trans-
fer pricing substantially contributes to BEPS.114 
BEPS is not a new problem.115 It already exists to a great extent out-
side of the cloud environment. But the recent emergence, rapid growth, and 
prevalent use of cloud computing have the potential to significantly con-
tribute to this widespread problem by increasing the likelihood that this type 
of base erosion will accelerate. Accordingly, this Part briefly describes how 
the transfer pricing rules currently contribute to BEPs.116 It then argues that 
some of the key characteristics of cloud computing may exacerbate risks of 
BEPS.117 
A. Transfer Pricing Rules as a Substantial Contributor to BEPS 
The correct application of the transfer pricing rules is critical, because 
it significantly affects the relevant share of an MNE’s profits that will be 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 754–55. 
 112 KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 11. 
 113  See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 39 
(“[B]roadly speaking BEPS focuses on moving profits to where they are taxed at lower rates and 
expenses to where they are relieved at higher rates.”). 
 114 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 10 
(explaining how current rules have revealed weaknesses that create opportunities for BEPS); 
Brauner, supra note 12, at 96 (describing the moving of intangibles away from high-tax jurisdic-
tions to low-tax jurisdictions as the “beating heart of BEPS planning”). 
 115 See Ault et al., supra note 17, at 275 n.4 (citing numerous reports on prior efforts to ad-
dress BEPS issues that go as far back as 1979). 
 116 See infra notes 118–146 and accompanying text. 
 117 See infra notes 151–185 and accompanying text. 
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subject to taxation in a particular jurisdiction.118 As discussed above, the 
transfer pricing rules apply the arm’s-length standard to determine the trans-
fer price between intercompany transactions, which requires that the results 
of these transactions be consistent with the results realized by independent, 
unrelated parties engaging in comparable transactions.119 As many leading 
commentators have noted, however, the transfer pricing rules and the arm’s-
length standard have been unsuccessful in equitably allocating profits 
among jurisdictions and preventing artificial profit-shifting.120 In fact, ag-
gressive manipulation of the transfer pricing rules has only continued to 
increase in recent years.121 The evolution of business models, the increased 
importance of intangibles, and the ability to contractually allocate risk have 
substantially contributed to this increase. 
1. Evolution of Business Models 
One fundamental problem with the current rules is that business prac-
tices have changed since the transfer pricing rules were first enacted, which 
makes it difficult to place transactions between related parties on tax parity 
with unrelated parties. When the arm’s-length standard was initially de-
signed, each jurisdiction in which an MNE group operated generally had its 
own fully integrated subsidiary to manage the group’s business in that mar-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See I.R.C. § 482 (2012) (noting the power of the Secretary of the Treasury to allocate 
income within an entity to better reflect the income of the entity). 
 119 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(a)–(b) (as amended in 2012). The arm’s-length standard is the interna-
tionally accepted standard underlying transfer pricing determinations. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE 
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 36; OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, 
supra note 6, at 31; DOERNBERG, supra note 8, at 282; Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 745 n.31. 
 120 See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, Transfer Pricing—Introductory, in 
FEDERAL TAXATION INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1, 2 (2016) (noting that the arm’s-length 
standard fails to take into account the fact that relationships between related parties are different 
from that of unrelated parties); DOERNBERG, supra note 8, at 282–83 (questioning the accuracy of 
arm’s-length prices and whether they even exist for most goods traded by MNEs); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah et al., Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 510–23 (2009) (proposing the replacement of the arm’s-length 
standard with a system of formulary apportionment); Benshalom, supra note 105, at 430 (charac-
terizing the arm’s-length model as “the most acute problem in international taxation and income 
taxation of corporate income today”); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 
TAX L. REV. 99, 148–49 (2011) (“[E]vidence has mounted that the [arm’s-length] model has 
failed as a practical matter . . . .”); Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 746 (noting that the mere 
existence of BEPS may present sufficient evidence to show that the arm’s-length model cannot 
defend against inappropriate income-shifting). 
 121 Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even Tea Party Condemns, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 13, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-13/
American-companies-dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-would-condemn.html [perma.cc/6H3L-
XTDB]. 
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ket.122 Because members of the MNE group were operating more like sepa-
rate economic actors, it was more feasible to find comparable transactions 
between unrelated parties. 
Nowadays, the separate legal entities forming the MNE group are no 
longer operating as separate economic actors, but instead are more likely to 
operate as a single integrated economic unit.123 This shift has minimized the 
importance of corporate legal structures and individual legal entities and has 
made the relationship between related parties fundamentally distinct from 
that of independent parties. 124 Moreover, global value chains “challenge 
orthodox notions of where economies find themselves on the value-added 
curve.”125 Thus, as others have also noted, “there is little reason to expect 
that observations of actual arm’s length prices even exist for most goods 
and services traded by [MNEs].”126 
In addition, as MNEs become more integrated and global value chains 
continue to become a common feature of today’s global economy, it has 
become easier for MNEs to shift functions, assets, and risks to jurisdictions 
with favorable tax regimes. MNEs are incentivized to shift profits in this 
manner under the current transfer pricing rules, because one of the underly-
ing assumptions of the arm’s-length standard is that the more extensive the 
functions, assets, and risks of one party to the transaction, the greater its 
expected share of the MNE’s profits.127 Thus, the lack of true comparables 
and the inherent ambiguity involved in identifying and valuing the inter-
company transactions of a single global firm facilitates an MNE’s ability to 
legally structure its operations to minimize its global effective tax rate.128 
Moreover, as a practical matter, it may be difficult for tax administrations to 
                                                                                                                           
 122 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 92. 
As the OECD has noted, “This structure was dictated by a number of factors, including slow 
communications, currency exchange rules, customs duties, and relatively high transportation costs 
that made integrated global supply chains difficult to operate.” Id. 
 123 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 25 (noting 
the shift in MNEs from country-specific operating models to global models); BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 120, at 2 (observing that modern MNEs operate as an economic unit). 
 124 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 92; 
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 120, at 2; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Formulary Apportionment 
in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 
(2014); Lee Sheppard, Transfer Pricing as Tax Avoidance, FORBES (June 25, 2010, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/24/tax-finance-multinational-economics-opinions-columnists-lee-
sheppard.html [perma.cc/NL42-TSBM]. 
 125 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 27. 
 126 DOERNBERG, supra note 8, at 282–83; see Sheppard, supra note 124 (“It is a fool’s errand 
to try to divine arm’s-length prices for intragroup transactions . . . .”). 
 127 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 42. 
 128 Benshalom, supra note 105, at 431. 
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enforce the transfer pricing rules under these circumstances, which further 
contributes to the BEPS problem.129 
2. Increased Importance of Intangibles 
Additionally, our current economy’s increasing reliance on intangibles 
as a source of value also contributes to tax-motivated restructurings. It is 
much easier for companies to shift risks and ownership of intangible assets 
than to shift the underlying functions.130 Intangible assets are by their very 
nature stateless, which makes them especially mobile.131 Specifically, the 
profits generated by an intangible asset are not dependent on where the in-
tangible asset was developed or the location of the legal owner.132 There is 
also a lack of comparables for most valuable intangible assets, since intel-
lectual property is by definition unique.133 Moreover, in allocating the in-
come attributable to an intangible asset among group members, the transfer 
pricing rules focus on the entity that is the legal owner of the intangible prop-
erty.134 Given these features, many corporate structures are able to “move” 
hard-to-value intangibles from their country of origin to low-tax jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See id. (asserting that the inability to determine the true cost of what unrelated parties 
would have done creates enforcement challenges). 
 130 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING supra note 8, at 42; see also 
Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 780–81 (citing OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 41–42) (contrasting the ease with which an MNE may shift intangible 
assets with the difficulty an MNE may face in shifting its underlying functions). 
 131 See Sheppard, supra note 124 (asserting that it is difficult to allocate income derived from 
IP due to its stateless nature). 
 132 See id. 
 133 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 120, at 4; Sheppard, supra note 124. For a thorough dis-
cussion of the unique features of intangibles that contribute to the challenges in valuating intangi-
bles, see generally Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles 
for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79 (2008) (discussing the theory and practice of 
valuation of intangibles in the context of transfer pricing rules). The U.S. transfer pricing rules 
include a “commensurate with income” standard that attempts to prevent MNEs from manipulat-
ing the transfer price of intangible assets. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (as amended in 2011). 
This standard provides that the price for the transfer of an intangible asset may be adjusted in later 
years to ensure that the transfer price is commensurate with the income actually attributable to the 
intangible. Id. This standard permits hindsight and is a departure from the arm’s-length standard. 
Id.; Brauner, supra, at 100–01. However, the commensurate with income standard has been un-
successful in minimizing price manipulation due to the standard’s many exceptions and the gov-
ernment’s interpretation of this standard to be consistent with the arm’s-length standard. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2); Brauner, supra, at 101 (noting that the government “aggressively 
interprets[s] the commensurate with income standard as if it is subject to the arm’s length princi-
ple”). Thus, despite this standard, MNEs are able to artificially shift intangibles and their associat-
ed profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 
 134 Brauner, supra note 133, at 125–26. 
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in a manner that avoids taxation of the income generated by these intangible 
rights in the high-tax country of origin, such as the United States.135 
For instance, MNEs may use cost-sharing or other legally permissible 
arrangements to shift certain intangibles to affiliates operating in a favora-
ble tax environment solely for tax purposes.136 Frequently, legal ownership 
of these assets is transferred to an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction through 
contractual arrangements in a manner that is not equivalent to functions per-
formed, assets used, or risks assumed related to the intangibles.137 As a re-
sult, the income generated by these intangible assets is also treated as aris-
ing in that low-tax jurisdiction, rather than the jurisdiction in which the 
economic return actually arises. 138  Tax administrations face tremendous 
hurdles in challenging these allocations because of the inherent difficulties 
in valuing intangible assets under the arm’s-length standard at the time of 
the transfer, the tax administration’s lack of information regarding the true 
nature of the transaction, and the possible transfer of unidentified intangi-
bles as part of the transaction.139 This creates tax planning opportunities for 
MNEs that present substantial risks of BEPS.140 
3. Ability to Contractually Allocate Risk 
Furthermore, MNEs contribute to BEPS through their use of contrac-
tual arrangements to allocate risk to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions in a 
manner that may not necessarily reflect the underlying economic reality of 
the single global firm.141 The allocation of risks has significant tax ramifica-
                                                                                                                           
 135 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 42 (noting 
the ease with which MNEs may shift intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions); Brauner, supra 
note 12, at 96; see also Brauner, supra note 133, at 83 (asserting that “our tax regime creates an 
incentive to invest abroad and particularly to invest extensively in intangibles to capture as much 
of the benefits embedded in the transfer pricing rules”). 
 136 For example, a transfer of intangibles can be achieved through licensing arrangements, 
cost contribution arrangements, or tax structures that separate deductions relevant to development 
of an intangible from the income associated with it. OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 91. 
 137 See id. (noting the frequency with which MNEs use contractual agreements to shift busi-
ness risk into low-tax jurisdictions). 
 138 See id. 
 139 See id.; Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 757 (illustrating the difficulties tax authorities 
face in challenging a MNEs allocation of profits). 
 140 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 89, 
91; Brauner, supra note 12, at 97 (noting that this type of tax planning has enabled U.S. MNEs to 
escape paying U.S. taxes on trillions of dollars of their foreign profits). 
 141 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751–52; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii) (providing 
guidance on how to analyze the risk in a transaction as a means to determine the comparability of 
two or more transactions); OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 
8, at 42, 45 (questioning how risk is actually distributed within an MNE group and whether trans-
fer pricing rules should easily accept contractual allocations of risk). 
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tions as it affects how the MNE’s income resulting from a particular trans-
action is allocated at arm’s-length through the transfer pricing of the trans-
action.142 Through these intercompany agreements, MNEs are able to legal-
ly shift risks so that operations in high-tax jurisdictions are attributed a 
smaller amount of the MNE’s overall profits even though important func-
tions related to these risks continue to be performed in the high-tax jurisdic-
tion.143 This is often achieved by separating business functions between af-
filiates so that the entities in high-tax jurisdictions that are contractually 
insulated from risk provide only low-profit, routine functions.144 As a result, 
MNEs can often successfully assert that the entire residual profit be allocat-
ed to the affiliate in the low-tax jurisdiction as the contractual risk-taker.145 
Because the transfer pricing rules under the arm’s-length standard generally 
respect risk allocations adopted by related parties, it is difficult for tax ad-
ministrations to re-characterize the transactions and challenge the income 
allocation consequences asserted to follow from them under the current 
rules.146 
B. How Cloud Computing Exacerbates the BEPS Problem 
Although MNEs have already been able to shift profits abroad, the 
mainstream use of cloud computing has the potential to dramatically en-
hance the scale at which such activity is possible. This section argues that 
the cloud environment facilitates BEPS strategies, which presents tremen-
dous challenges to governments worldwide as they try to protect their tax 
bases.147 In particular, the cloud environment contributes to BEPS because 
the nature of cloud computing (1) enables an MNE group to more easily 
locate the cloud service provider in a low-tax jurisdiction;148 (2) provides 
opportunities for an MNE group to strip their earnings from a high-tax ju-
risdiction through inflated payments to an affiliated cloud service provider 
located in a low-tax jurisdiction;149 and (3) creates cost savings that increase 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751–52; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii); OECD, 
ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 42, 45. 
 143 See OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 
92 (noting that revised guidance focuses on allocating the “appropriate return” to those entities 
that maintain significant risks). 
 144 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751–52; see OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 92 (identifying the practice of MNEs to contractually 
insulate entities from risk in order to take advantage of transfer pricing rules). 
 145 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 92; 
Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751–52. 
 146 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii); OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFT-
ING, supra note 8, at 42. 
 147 See infra notes 151–185 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 151–166 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 167–171 and accompanying text. 
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the MNE group’s residual profits in a manner that facilitates allocating 
those profits to a low-tax jurisdiction.150 
1. Ease of Relocating to Low-Tax Jurisdictions 
Cloud computing, which occurs almost entirely in the virtual world, is 
an essentially borderless and globally integrated business model.151 It has 
eliminated the need for local IT infrastructure and increased the mobility of 
IT resources by allowing companies to share a pool of configurable compu-
ting resources remotely through the cloud.152 This has created opportunities 
for MNEs to move their cloud service provider to a low-tax jurisdiction 
without affecting the quality of business operations.153 Thus, intercompany 
payments for those cloud computing services can be used to strip the earn-
ings of the MNE group from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions 
even when there is no transfer pricing abuse involved.154 
For instance, although functions are often located in a specific country 
for business reasons, the increasingly mobile nature of the business func-
tions related to the cloud facilitates an MNE’s ability to shift these functions 
to jurisdictions that generate tax benefits.155 Specifically, under the typical 
cloud business model, an MNE’s software and its corresponding business 
functionality reside on servers owned and managed by the cloud service 
provider, which is accessed remotely by users.156 The MNE’s servers, data 
centers, and other IT infrastructure can be located almost anywhere with 
little to no effect on economic activity.157 They do not need to be located in 
the same place as the software users.158 Moreover, often times servers and 
other cloud infrastructure may be located in multiple jurisdictions, thereby 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See infra notes 172–185 and accompanying text. 
 151 See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2 (listing the essential characteristics of cloud com-
puting); Mazur, supra note 1, at 9 (differentiating traditional software transactions from cloud 
computing because the latter occurs almost entirely in the virtual world). 
 152 EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 40; DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 28. 
 153 See OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 
64–68 (identifying mobility with respect to intangibles, users, and business functions as a key 
feature of the digital economy); Llinas et al., supra note 78 (noting the ease through which entities 
can relocate their cloud activities). 
 154 Mazur, supra note 25, at 6. 
 155 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 65–
68. 
 156 Mazur, supra note 1, at 10. Thus, users can obtain core and critical business functionality 
without ever receiving either physical or electronic possession of the company’s core business 
software. See id. (“In a cloud computing transaction, a cloud vendor solely provides the purchaser 
with electronic access to a computer program, applications, and corresponding data.”). 
 157 Kushida et al., supra note 95, at 211–12; Mazur, supra note 1, at 10. 
 158 Kushida et al., supra note 95, at 211–12; Mazur, supra note 1, at 10. 
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distributing the business functionalities accessed by affiliates into numerous 
low-tax jurisdictions.159 
Because tax guidance has generally emphasized the operation of the 
software on the servers in allocating profits among activities, the cloud en-
vironment provides MNEs with the opportunity to allocate significant prof-
its to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions and avoid taxation in market jurisdic-
tions merely by moving the servers to those jurisdictions. By doing so, 
MNEs that operate in the cloud and use software as a key component of 
their businesses are able to locate core and critical business functionality in 
low-tax affiliates with little impact on their business operations. This is es-
pecially true as MNEs adopt more smart servers, which require minimal 
management effort and service provider interaction.160As another commen-
tator accurately noted, “In these circumstances, profits could be diverted 
from countries that have any meaningful connection to the profit-making 
activities, i.e. to a country where the business is based and the intangibles 
were developed.”161 This is a huge shift from way it has been done for the 
last fifty years and raises substantial BEPS concerns.162 
Furthermore, given the virtual nature of cloud computing, employees 
can perform many cloud computing functions remotely.163 Because cloud 
computing transforms the licensing of software and other applications and 
the managing of captive IT infrastructure assets into the purchase of cloud 
computing services, this feature is magnified in the cloud context.164 As a 
result, the cloud environment further facilitates an MNE’s ability to frag-
ment and move core IT functions to geographic locations that are distant 
from the physical location of its users and that are advantageous from a tax 
perspective. For instance, an MNE can locate the personnel that manage, 
maintain, and support the IT infrastructure and provide software technical 
support services in a low-tax jurisdiction, which may differ from the market 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 41 (noting that “the business functionalities that 
these employees are accessing are now spread out into other cities or other countries”). 
 160 DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 28. 
 161 Bal, supra note 102, at 337. The OECD has also observed that MNEs have been increas-
ingly able to allocate key functions in ways that may not correspond to actual business functions 
performed and that would not be chosen in the absence of tax considerations. See OECD, ACTION 
1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 65. 
 162 See EY Roundtable, supra note 23, at 40 (distinguishing current practices from past prac-
tices, the latter involving “a big install, a big conversion, a lot of data movement and everything 
was on premise within the four walls”). 
 163 Mazur, supra note 1, at 30. 
 164 See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 148 (stating that “cloud computing moves a company 
from managing captive IT infrastructure assets to purchasing a service provided by vendors”); see 
also supra notes 130–140 and accompanying text (discussing the increased importance of intangi-
ble assets and the ease with which corporate structures are able to move these assets to low-tax 
jurisdictions).  
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jurisdiction. As a result, profits of the MNE may be reported in this low-tax 
jurisdiction, even though the actual business activities related to these prof-
its arguably occur elsewhere. Thus, by transforming the provision of IT re-
sources into more of a service industry, cloud computing often creates op-
portunities for MNEs to “segregate the location where actual business activ-
ities and investment take place from the location where profits are reported 
for tax purposes.”165 
Alternatively, even if the IT personnel are physically located in the 
market jurisdiction, current law may nevertheless treat the services income 
as being generated in a different jurisdiction. It is currently unclear whether 
cloud services will be treated as being performed at the location of the per-
sonnel or the location of the cloud infrastructure that the personnel remotely 
manage and that deploys the MNE’s business software.166 Consequently, it 
may be possible that the physical location of the hardware that deploys the 
software, such as servers and other computer infrastructure, constitutes the 
place where the employees are performing the cloud computing services. 
Because the IT infrastructure can be located at a physical location that is 
distant from its users, an MNE group may structure its operations so that the 
IT infrastructure that hosts the software, data, and other business functions 
are located in a low-tax jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the MNE 
group may be able to successfully argue that the business activities per-
formed by its IT personnel are being performed in the low-tax jurisdiction 
and allocate more profits to that jurisdiction. In other words, an MNE group 
may be able to shift its services income without having to move its people. 
2. Use of Inflated Payments 
Although shifting functions and assets to low-tax jurisdictions as a 
means of lowering the overall tax burden of the MNE group is arguably not 
objectionable in itself, cloud computing also facilitates the opportunity of 
MNEs to inflate the payments made for cloud computing services by affili-
ates in high-tax jurisdictions to the affiliated cloud service provider that is 
located in a low-tax jurisdiction. As a result, through the transfer pricing 
                                                                                                                           
 165 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 20. 
 166 Mazur, supra note 1, at 30. The place of performance is unlikely to be treated as occurring 
at the location of the users under current law. See Piedras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm’r, 43 
B.T.A. 297, 309 (1941) (considering the location of the capital and labor—not the location of the 
company’s customers—as the location where the income-producing services of a radio broadcast-
ing business were rendered), aff’d, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942); Mazur, supra note 1, at 30–31 
(explaining that generally “the [Internal Revenue] Code sources services income to the place 
where services are performed,” but that this application of the law may not be appropriate in the 
cloud computing context). 
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rules, MNEs are able to shift the profits of the MNE group to low-tax juris-
dictions and erode the tax base of many high-tax jurisdictions. 
The cloud environment contributes to these types of BEPS strategies 
by further enabling companies to globally integrate their operations. As dis-
cussed above, as companies become more globally integrated, major chal-
lenges arise in accurately applying the arm’s-length standard, because the 
separate legal entities forming the MNE group are no longer operating as 
separate economic actors.167 Multiple related entities often provide the dif-
ferent elements of the cloud computing services and contribute to the group 
synergies and residual profits of the MNE group in a manner that is not typ-
ical of comparable independent companies. Under these circumstances, it is 
often difficult to find comparable transactions to use as a benchmark for 
determining the appropriate charge for the cloud computing services. As a 
result, MNEs have the opportunity to make inflated payments to the low-
taxed cloud service provider, which the tax authorities may find difficult to 
challenge. 
Moreover, as cloud computing becomes an essential part of an MNE’s 
global supply chain, additional challenges arise in determining the arm’s-
length charge for the cloud services, because cloud computing changes the 
economic activity of a business and how value is created. This gives rise to 
issues in isolating, identifying, and valuing the numerous value-drivers in-
volved in the cloud business model. 168 It is, however, relatively easy to 
move many of these value-drivers to low-tax jurisdictions. As a result, these 
ambiguities regarding the value-drivers of the cloud computing services, 
together with the lack of comparables, make it easier for an MNE to argue 
that a particular activity, which it has located in a low-tax jurisdiction, is the 
primary value-driver and to have legal structures and contracts in place that 
support the payment made to the low-tax jurisdiction. Thus, an MNE group 
may be able to over-allocate its profits to the low-tax jurisdictions. 
By artificially shifting income between affiliates in a manner that max-
imizes the MNE group’s overall effective tax rate to the detriment of the 
countries where such profits economically arose, MNEs potentially may 
contribute to base erosion of the high-tax jurisdictions. Tax administrations 
will likely find it difficult to challenge this outcome, because the arm’s-
length standard is ineffective in making the transfer pricing outcome in line 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See supra notes 122–129 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution of the MNE 
business model from one where members of the MNE group were separate economic actors to one 
where the MNE functions as a single integrated economic unit). 
 168 See supra notes 79–101 and accompanying text (stressing the importance and difficulty of 
identifying the value-drivers of cloud transactions in the context of MNEs). 
2016] Transfer Pricing Challenges in the Cloud 675 
with value creation in this context.169 Thus, the same problems that already 
exist today get repeated, but on a much larger scale as more and more com-
panies engage in cross-border cloud computing.170 
In addition, as with other digital businesses, cloud computing services 
often rely on intangibles, such as software, as a source of value.171 By in-
corporating cloud computing into their supply chain, MNEs can continue to 
take advantage of existing transfer pricing strategies to shift ownership of 
intangibles abroad, such as cost-sharing arrangements, contribution or other 
methods. Transferring legal ownership of the software to a low-tax affiliate 
in this manner allows an MNE to shift additional income to a low tax juris-
diction and lower its overall tax base. Even though a high-tax affiliate may 
have economically contributed to the creation of this income by developing 
or funding the development of the intangible, the low-tax affiliate is treated 
as generating the majority of the income, thereby eroding the tax base of the 
high-tax jurisdiction. 
3. Creation of Residual Profits 
The cloud environment also provides the ideal circumstances for BEPS 
through the creation of substantial cost savings and group synergies that 
contribute to residual profits, which would not otherwise exist.172 Through 
the use of the transfer pricing rules, MNEs can allocate these cost savings 
and synergies to a low-tax jurisdiction in a manner that potentially minimiz-
es their overall worldwide tax liability. This type of profit shifting often 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Benshalom, supra note 105, at 431 (asserting that the inability to determine the true 
cost of what unrelated parties would have done makes enforcing the arm’s-length standard ex-
tremely difficult as a practical matter). 
 170 See Drucker, supra note 121 (noting that U.S. companies amassed at least $1 trillion in 
foreign profits not taxed in the United States as of the end of 2009, in part due to a significant 
increase in inappropriate transfer pricing practices). 
 171 See Jones, supra note 29, at 4–5, 19 (“The new digital economy in turn emphasizes intan-
gible property and its subsequent development, protection, and exploitation.”). For instance, when 
a member of an MNE group acts as a cloud service provider to other members and provides them 
access to the company’s proprietary software that is hosted on its IT infrastructure, and the mem-
bers use that software to generate business from unrelated customers, the cloud service provider is 
contributing to the value of the MNE group. This is an example of the software as a service 
(“SaaS”) cloud computing business model. See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2 (defining 
SaaS); Mazur, supra note 1, at 8 & n.19 (discussing SaaS in the context of classifying a transac-
tion as a transfer of a copyright-protected article). Other common cloud computing models that 
currently exist include infrastructure as a service (“IaaS”) and platform as a service (“PaaS”). 
MELL & GRANCE, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 172 See Cockfield, supra note 17, at 937 (“[T]he digital environment is changing the ways that 
firms combine and operate to reduce transaction costs and generate synergies among cross-border 
operations.”); KPMG INT’L, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that a business’s transition to the cloud 
often results in a more effective and cheaper IT arrangement); supra notes 102–112 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the creation of cost savings and group synergies in the cloud environment). 
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occurs at the expense of the jurisdictions where the residual profits econom-
ically arose. 
Generally, an MNE moving its business to the cloud may be able to 
justify allocating these residual profits to a low-tax jurisdiction under the 
arm’s-length standard through the use of a transactional transfer pricing 
method. Traditional transactional transfer pricing methods, which include 
the comparable uncontrolled services price, gross services margin method, 
and comparable profits methods, are “one-sided” methods.173 As one com-
mentator explains, these methods “apply the arm’s length standard by mak-
ing one party the ‘tested party’ that is entitled to only a ‘routine profit.’”174 
In other words, the entities that are treated as the “tested parties” are ex-
cluded from participating in any residual profits.175 The U.S. transfer pric-
ing rules generally treat the “tested party” as the affiliate that is the least 
complex and is most easily compared to comparable transactions between 
unrelated parties.176 Pursuant to these rules, MNEs can essentially choose 
the affiliate that will serve as the tested party by structuring their arrange-
ments so that the affiliate in the high-tax jurisdiction bears little risk with 
respect to core business functions, owns few assets that are used in the 
business, and provides only straightforward, routine functions, such as 
technical support.177 As a result of these arrangements, an MNE can justify 
allocating to this high-tax affiliate only a routine profit margin based on 
comparable transactions that occur between independent entities.178 
By ensuring that the low-taxed foreign affiliate is the more complex 
party, the residual and more substantial income would then be entirely allo-
cated to this untested party by default without the need to identify a compa-
rable unrelated transaction or any further explanation.179 Even though other 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 749. 
 174 Id. at 749 n.41. 
 175 See id. at 755–56 (detailing case law supporting the practice of leaving residual profits 
with the untested party). 
 176 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(2)(i), (e) (as amended in 2011); Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 
751. 
 177 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 942, 954 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the trans-
actions between a subsidiary shipping company located in a tax-exempt jurisdiction and its parent 
MNE satisfied the arm’s-length standard, despite the fact that the MNE had manipulated prices in 
order to maximize the profits of the tax-exempt subsidiary); Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751 
(recognizing the incentive for MNEs to label its U.S. affiliate as the “tested party” in order to 
reduce its tax liability). 
 178 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 751. 
 179 See U.S. Steel Corp., 617 F.2d at 945 (allowing a subsidiary located in a tax-exempt juris-
diction to keep all residual profits without explanation, effectively turning the subsidiary into an 
offshore tax shelter); Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 75 (noting that once an agreement is 
reached between related entities as to which party should be the “tested party,” the “profit alloca-
tions are no longer controversial because the routine profits attributable to routine functions are 
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affiliates may have developed the software that the MNE uses in its core 
business to produce a substantial profit, provided employees, contributed 
capital to fund the deployment and maintenance of the cloud, or performed 
other substantial economic activities, these contributions are disregarded. 
Through use of these one-sided methods, any additional profit generated by 
cloud synergies will go to the entity in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction and po-
tentially escape taxation altogether. Furthermore, the payments that the 
high-tax affiliates make to the low-tax affiliate for the cloud computing ser-
vices will be higher, which can give rise to base eroding tax deductions in 
the high-tax jurisdiction.180 Thus, through proactive tax planning, MNEs 
can minimize their global effective tax rates merely by framing affiliates 
that are located in high-tax jurisdictions as the “tested” parties and those in 
low-tax jurisdictions as the “untested” party, and it will often be difficult for 
tax authorities to challenge this result.181 
In addition, as discussed above, the cloud environment facilitates the 
shifting of functions and assets to low-tax affiliates, which would help make 
the low-tax affiliate the more complex, tested party for transfer pricing pur-
poses. The use of cloud computing also preserves the circumstances that 
currently make risk-shifting possible, which an MNE can use to further 
support its claim that the low-tax affiliates should be treated as the tested 
party.182 In particular, the cloud business model, by its nature, shifts risks 
and control with respect to the software and underlying IT infrastructure 
from the user to the cloud vendor, which the MNE group can more easily 
locate in a low-tax jurisdiction.183 An MNE group can also shift the risk of 
the cloud deployment to a low-tax affiliate through intercompany agree-
ments and by capitalizing the low-tax affiliate with sufficient capital to fund 
the economic costs and assume responsibility for the risks of the business. 
                                                                                                                           
common knowledge among those experienced in transfer pricing matters—both for the taxpayer 
and the taxing authority”). 
 180 See OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 
92 (discussing how MNEs may insulate high-tax affiliates from risk by shifting risk to low-tax 
affiliates). 
 181 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 750–52. It is currently difficult for tax administrations to 
challenge the allocation of the entire residual profit to the untested party that is located in the low-
tax jurisdiction, because of the procedural posture of the parties. Id. at 757. For instance, the tax 
administration would have to discover whether the local affiliate owned a non-routine intangible 
that contributed significantly to earning those residual profits. Id. 
 182 As discussed above, even before the emergence of cloud computing, companies had been 
able to shift many risks through contractual arrangements between related entities. This opportuni-
ty continues to exist in the cloud context. See supra notes 141–146 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how MNEs contribute to BEPS through their use of contractual arrangements to allocate 
risk to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions in a manner that may not necessarily reflect the underly-
ing economic reality of the single global firm). 
 183 See Mazur, supra note 1, at 10 (distinguishing the traditional software distribution model 
where the purchaser carried the risk from the cloud model where the vendor carries the risk). 
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Similarly, the MNE group can shift the technological risks relating to the 
success of the business to this group member by transferring legal owner-
ship of the company’s intangibles and infrastructure to the low-tax affiliate. 
Moreover, because an internal company cloud enables MNEs to fragment 
their operations among multiple group entities, MNEs are able to structure 
their operations so that high-tax affiliates provide only low-profit, routine 
functions, thereby further insulating them from risk. Through these risk-
shifting strategies, MNEs can often justify allocating the entire residual 
profit to the low-tax affiliates. 
In conclusion, the virtual and globally integrated nature of the cloud 
contributes to an MNE’s ability to structure its operations in a manner that 
allows it to move its income-generating transactions and to select the juris-
dictions in which such income is taxed, or more likely, not taxed.184 As a 
result, it is no surprise that cloud computing has become a “recent and ob-
vious manifestation of BEPS.”185 
III. ADDRESSING BEPS IN THE CLOUD COMPUTING CONTEXT 
The use of aggressive transfer pricing to artificially shift profits to low- 
or no-tax jurisdictions is a pressing and current problem that is being expe-
rienced worldwide.186 It leads to governments losing substantial tax revenue 
as profits are shifted in ways that erode the taxable base to jurisdictions 
where profits are subject to a more favorable tax treatment.187 This creates 
tax policy concerns, because this often results in stateless income – income 
that disappears for tax purposes.188 Additionally, artificially shifting profits 
                                                                                                                           
 184 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 10. 
 185 Jones, supra note 29, at 20. 
 186 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 187 Id. at 13. This is a critical issue in both territorial and worldwide tax systems. As a result of 
this type of aggressive tax planning by MNEs, transfer pricing outcomes are not in line with value 
creation and the taxing rights of jurisdictions fail to capture economic activity occurring within 
their borders. This directly affects the source tax base of the jurisdiction. Because the source tax 
base is the only tax base in a territorial system, aggressive transfer pricing methods result in a 
significant loss of revenues. Similarly, this type of tax planning also erodes the tax base of the 
United States. In the present U.S. tax system, these issues affect the classification of income as 
foreign or domestic for purposes of determining which items benefit from deferral. Therefore, as 
MNEs continue to artificially and successfully allocate more income to foreign jurisdictions, more 
income escapes U.S. taxation. Moreover, aggressive transfer pricing also affects the classification 
of income as foreign or domestic for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation. See I.R.C. § 901 
(2012) (providing a direct foreign tax credit for income taxes paid to non-U.S. governments). A 
system that allows MNEs to artificially shift income abroad to low-tax jurisdictions may result in 
a foreign tax credit that does more than eliminate double taxation. To avoid this result, such in-
come should not be treated as foreign for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation if the in-
come does not bear a significant foreign tax. 
 188 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 10; 
OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 39, 47; see Edward 
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abroad in this manner poses a serious risk to tax sovereignty, tax fairness, 
and the integrity of the corporate income tax.189 To prevent a worsening of 
these problems, it is imperative that countries work together to implement an 
international solution to BEPS. This Part discusses the BEPS Action Plan, its 
recommendations for reform and its shortcomings. It then argues that adop-
tion of formulary apportionment or the profit-split methodology would better 
address the BEPs problem in the context of cloud computing. 
A. BEPS Action Plan 
The OECD’s work on the BEPS Action Plan seeks to address these is-
sues by adopting proposals to ensure that profits are taxed where the eco-
nomic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is 
created.190 Although cloud computing is not the focus of the action items 
addressing transfer pricing issues, intercompany cloud-based activities natu-
rally involve the transfer pricing rules. This section discusses some of the 
recommendations put forth by the OECD to address aggressive transfer 
pricing and analyzes the likelihood of success in the cloud computing con-
text. In particular, subsection 1 describes the OECD’s suggestion that the 
use of the profit split methodology is appropriate in certain situations. Sub-
section 2 then discusses the OECD’s recommendations for minimizing the 
intercompany shifting of intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions through chang-
es to the transfer pricing rules. Finally, subsection 3 discusses the OECD’s 
proposed rules to prevent MNEs from artificially transferring risks among 
group members. 
1. Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains 
With respect to the transfer pricing rules, the OECD’s report suggests 
that the profit split method may be more reliable than one-sided methods in 
                                                                                                                           
D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 700 (2011) (defining the term “stateless 
income”). 
 189 OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 5, 8. 
 190 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 20–
21 (providing action plans to ensure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation). 
The first major batch of deliverables was published in September 2014. See generally ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: EX-
ECUTIVE SUMMARIES 2014 DELIVERABLES (2014) (providing recommendations for how to pre-
vent tax avoidance by MNEs). On October 5, 2015, the OECD published thirteen final reports and 
an explanatory statement outlining consensus action under the BEPS project. OECD Presents 
Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at G20 Finance Ministers Meeting, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (May 10, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-presents-outputs-
of-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm [perma.cc/QBW9-
FXGJ]. 
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certain circumstances.191 For instance, where there is a high integration of 
functions and risks, a multisided and integrated business, multiple parties 
providing highly valuable and unique functions, or an integration and shar-
ing of risks, then the profit split methods may be viewed as a means of 
achieving “a closer alignment between profits and value creation.”192 Simi-
larly, where fragmentation of functions gives rise to significant challenges 
in finding comparable transactions, it is feasible that use of the profit split 
method could support outcomes of pricing based on potential compara-
bles.193 Thus, pursuant to the OECD’s report, taxpayers and tax administra-
tions may apply the profit split method as the default method under certain 
circumstances.194 
In the cloud computing context, use of the profit split methods would 
minimize an MNE’s ability to engage in tax planning that results in BEPS. 
When a profit split method is used “the taxpayer has the burden of showing 
that its allocation of residual profits follows the substantive functions that 
created the MNE’s residual profits.”195 Thus, use of profit split methodologies 
would help prevent MNEs from allocating a significant portion of their prof-
its to low-tax affiliates that provide non-routine services and own the non-
routine intangibles through intercompany agreements. Instead, when corpo-
                                                                                                                           
 191 See OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 
92 (asserting that the profit split method can be useful when properly applied in certain circum-
stances, but noting that further work remains to develop profit splitting factors that show strong 
correlation with value creation). 
 192 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BEPS ACTION 10: DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE 
USE OF PROFIT SPLITS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 10 (2014) [hereinafter 
OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON ACTION 10]; see OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUT-
COMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 100, at 57–61 (providing guidance on the use of the 
profit split method). This may not always be the case, however. For instance, an appropriate 
method using inexact comparables may be a more reliable method than the profit split method if 
the actual transaction is such that sharing of profits or losses under a profit split represents a fun-
damentally different commercial relationship between the parties so that a share of profits would 
be unlikely to represent an arm’s-length outcome. OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUT-
COMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 100, at 57–60. Moreover, this report is not finalized 
with respect to guidance on the use of the profit split method. The OECD intends to provide addi-
tional guidance to distinguish the situations when the profit split method is likely to be the most 
appropriate method even when such circumstances exist. Id. at 57–61. 
 193 OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON ACTION 10, supra note 192, at 8. However, the OECD’s 
final report does not contain similar language to this effect. OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING 
OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 100, at 57–61. 
 194 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 
100, at 57–61; Letter from Isabel Verlinden, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Brussels, & Adam 
M. Katz, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, N.Y., to Andrew Hickman, Head, Transfer Pric-
ing Unit, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 2 (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/
tax-policy-administration/beps/assets/beps-use-of-profit.pdf [perma.cc/S3AE-9V5R] [hereinafter 
Verlinden & Katz]. 
 195 Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 761; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3) (as amended in 
2009) (describing the profit split method and how and when to use it). 
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rate synergies arising from deliberate corporate group actions provide a 
member of an MNE group with material advantages not typical of compara-
ble independent companies, the residual profit associated with such synergies 
would generally need to be shared by group members in proportion to their 
contribution to the creation of the synergy.196 In other words, the profit split 
methodology makes it difficult for companies to separate functions from the 
profits that they generate.197 Challenges remain, however, due to the uncer-
tainties that exist in identifying, locating, and valuing the value-drivers. These 
uncertainties give rise to issues in determining the extent of each entity’s con-
tribution and therefore the appropriate arm’s-length price. Additional guid-
ance would be warranted to help resolve these issues when the cloud is in-
volved. 
2. Rules to Prevent Intercompany Shifting of Intangibles 
The OECD has also recommended changes to the transfer pricing rules, 
which seek to minimize the ability of an MNE to significantly reduce its 
worldwide tax liability by moving its intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions.198 
Specifically, the OECD recommends that the determination of which entity is 
the legal owner of the intangible should be treated as “separate and distinct” 
from the question of remuneration under the arm’s-length principal.199 Thus, 
concluding that a particular entity is the legal owner of the intangible or has 
funded the development of the intangible would not automatically entitle 
that entity to the returns from exploiting the intangible or the residual re-
turns derived from such exploitation, even where this return may initially 
accrue to the legal owner as a result of its legal or contractual rights.200 
Instead, the determination of which entities in an MNE group should be 
entitled to retain the economic profit from exploitation of intangibles would 
depend on the contributions made by each group member through functions 
performed, assets used, and risks assumed that contribute to the value of the 
                                                                                                                           
 196 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 
100, at 48. 
 197 See Wells & Lowell, supra note 8, at 761 (noting that “[i]f the taxpayer cannot explain 
how a tax haven’s activities functionally contributed to the creation of residual profits, it would 
receive a zero allocation”). 
 198 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 
100, at 63–115. The OECD has recommended changes to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines 
that (i) clarify the definition of intangibles; (ii) provide guidance on identifying transactions in-
volving intangibles; (iii) provide supplemental guidance for determining the arm’s-length condi-
tions for transactions involving intangibles; and (iv) provide guidance on the transfer pricing 
treatment of local market features and corporate synergies. Id. 
 199 Id. at 76. 
 200 Id. Instead, “[a]n associated enterprise providing funding and assuming the related finan-
cial risks, but not performing any functions relating to the intangible, could generally only expect 
a risk-adjusted return on its funding.” Id. at 65. 
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intangible.201 In identifying these arm’s-length prices, the functions, risks, and 
assets that need to be assessed include those related to the development, en-
hancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. 202 
Through these changes, the OECD’s recommendations seek to ensure that 
entities within an MNE group that contribute value to the intangible property, 
either by performing or managing development functions or by bearing and 
controlling risks, are appropriately rewarded for doing so.203 
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the issue of how to price in-
tercompany transactions involving intangibles, and many practical difficul-
ties remain in applying these rules both within and outside of the cloud con-
text. As discussed above, cloud computing often results in a level of integra-
tion that makes it difficult to isolate the value-drivers, including the impact 
of any particular intangible on the MNE group’s profits. As a result, moving 
to the cloud presents challenges in applying the recommended changes be-
cause of the difficulties in identifying where value is created in the cloud. 
Despite these challenges, the OECD recommendations are a step in the right 
direction because they minimize the ability of companies to allocate profits 
to locations where the value with respect to the intangible is not created. 
Specifically, the OECD recommendations reduce the emphasis on the loca-
tion of the legal owner of the intangibles and instead emphasize the location 
where the research and development funds originate, where research and 
development occurs, and where manufacturing, marketing, and distribution 
to exploit the intangibles takes place. Because it is clear that value is not 
created where there is no capital, where significant research and develop-
ment does not occur, and where consumers are not located to benefit from 
the use of the intangible, the BEPS report helps to at least minimize some of 
the current strategies for artificially shifting profits related to intangibles.204 
Moreover, the cloud business model often results in various members 
of an MNE group owning and using different intangibles and performing 
activities related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protec-
tion, and exploitation of an intangible, often in a way and with a level of 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Id. at 73–74. 
 202 Id. 
 203 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 91. 
The OECD has also proposed changes to address the issues presented by cost-sharing arrange-
ments. See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra 
note 100, at 161–81 (providing “general guidance for determining whether the conditions estab-
lished by associated enterprises for transactions covered by a [cost contribution agreement] are 
consistent with the arm’s length principle”). 
 204 See Brauner, supra note 12, at 75 (“[D]espite the difficulty of determining where value is 
created, it is not difficult to understand where it is not created.”). 
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integration that does not generally exist between unrelated entities.205 Thus, 
transactions involving intangibles continue to create challenges due to the 
lack of comparable independent transactions involving intangibles, as well 
as a lack of comparability between the intangibles, themselves.206 Given 
these circumstances, a thorough functional analysis does not necessarily 
give rise to an arm’s-length result. Instead, use of the profit split method 
may be a more reliable method of determining the arm’s-length price where 
it is not possible to identify reliable comparable uncontrolled transac-
tions.207 Other valuation methods that depart from the arm’s-length standard 
may also be needed to estimate the arm’s-length price where comparables 
are unavailable.208 For instance, the OECD has suggested the use of ex post 
information as presumptive evidence as to the reliability of the information 
used ex ante in determining the transfer price for “hard-to-value intangi-
bles.”209 Similarly, the current U.S. transfer pricing rules include a “com-
mensurate with income” standard that provides that the price for the transfer 
of an intangible asset may be adjusted in later years to ensure that the trans-
fer price is commensurate with the income actually attributable to the intan-
gible.210 To be successful at minimizing manipulative transfer pricing prac-
                                                                                                                           
 205 See supra notes 79–112 and accompanying text (exploring how the cloud business model 
raises fundamental questions regarding how value is added, which creates difficulties in isolating 
the value-drivers and, therefore the relevant comparables, for an MNE group operating in the 
cloud). This issue also exists outside of the cloud environment. See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER 
PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 100, at 74 (listing factors that can create 
challenges anytime intangibles are involved); Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 153–54 (noting that 
although collaborative frameworks cause transfer pricing issues outside of the cloud, the cloud has 
the potential to increase the likelihood those issues arise). 
 206 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 
100, at 74. 
 207 Id. at 101. 
 208 See id. at 102 (proposing the use of income based valuation techniques, especially those 
“premised on the calculation of the discounted value of projected income streams or cash flows 
derived from the exploitation of the intangible being valued”). 
 209 Id. at 109–10. The OECD’s report defines “hard-to-value” intangibles as intangibles for 
which, at the time of their transfer in a transaction between related entities, (i) no sufficiently reli-
able comparable exists, (ii) there is a lack of reliable projections of future cash flows or income 
expected to be derived from the transferred intangible, or (iii) the assumptions used in valuing the 
intangible are highly uncertain. Id. at 110. Alternatively, as some commentators have suggested, 
formulary apportionment may be useful in this regard. See, e.g., Brauner, supra note 133, at 160–
64 (arguing that a formula-based transfer pricing model is both practically and theoretically more 
desirable than the current arm’s-length-based regime); Louise M. Kauder, Intercompany Pricing 
and Section 482: A Proposal to Shift from Uncontrolled Comparables to Formulary Apportion-
ment Now, 58 TAX NOTES 485, 486–87 (1993) (arguing that § 482 already authorizes formulary 
apportionment, U.S. tax treaties do not prohibit it, and it is the only way for multinational organi-
zations to achieve reasonable results). 
 210  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (as amended in 2011). The “commensurate with income” 
standard attempts to prevent MNEs from manipulating the transfer price of intangible assets by 
permitting hindsight in pricing intangibles. See id. (citing I.R.C. § 482 (2012)). Thus, it is techni-
cally a departure from the arm’s-length standard. Id.; Brauner, supra note 133, at 100–01. 
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tices involving intangibles, however, these types of standards need to be 
interpreted as a departure from the arm’s-length standard and consistently 
applied by tax administrations.211 
3. Rules to Prevent Intercompany Transferring of Risks 
The BEPS Action Plan also seeks to “[d]evelop rules to prevent BEPS 
by transferring risks among, or allocating excessive capital to, group mem-
bers.”212 This action item involves adopting transfer pricing rules or special 
measures that minimize an MNE’s ability to shift income to an affiliate 
merely because that entity has contractually assumed risks or provided capi-
tal.213 With these goals in mind, the OECD’s report suggests that the trans-
fer pricing rules should focus on the conduct of the parties, rather than fo-
cusing solely on intercompany agreements, when identifying which entities 
bear risk with respect to particular operational activities.214 Specifically, an 
allocation of risk to a particular entity should not be made merely because 
that entity has contractually assumed the risk.215 The OECD’s approach re-
quires consideration of both how the risks are controlled in the business and 
which party’s functions enable it to face and mitigate the risks associated 
with business activities in making this determination.216 The report also rec-
ommends that intercompany arrangements be disregarded for transfer pric-
ing purposes when the transaction does not have the fundamental economic 
attributes of arrangements between independent parties.217 By endorsing the 
view that a “commercial rationality test” is necessary to respect the transac-
tion, the OECD’s proposal represents a departure from the arm’s-length 
principle.218 
                                                                                                                           
 211 For instance, despite the “commensurate with income” standard set forth in the U.S. trans-
fer pricing rules, MNEs are able to artificially shift intangibles and their associated profits to low-
tax jurisdictions. This standard has been unsuccessful in minimizing price manipulation due to the 
standard’s many exceptions and the government’s interpretation of this standard to be consistent 
with the arm’s-length standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2); Brauner, supra note 133, at 101. 
 212 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 20. 
 213 Id. 
 214 OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 
100, at 29, 31–32. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 20–25. 
 217 Id. at 39. According to the discussion draft, a transaction would satisfy this new standard if 
it would “offer each of the parties a reasonable expectation to enhance or protect their commercial 
or financial positions on a risk-adjusted (the return adjusted for the level of risk associated with it) 
basis, compared to other opportunities realistically available to them at the time the arrangement 
was entered into.” ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BEPS ACTIONS 8, 9, AND 10: DIS-
CUSSION DRAFT ON REVISIONS TO CHAPTER I OF THE TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 26 (2014) 
[hereinafter OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 1]. 
 218 See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra 
note 100, at 38–40 (describing circumstances in which the commercial rationality test is necessary 
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The goals of the BEPS Action Plan with respect to these risk issues are 
a necessary step to minimizing BEPS in the context of most MNE opera-
tions, including cloud computing. As recognized in the OECD’s final report 
related to addressing the tax challenges of the digital economy, BEPS struc-
tures often involve contractual arrangements that allocate risks to low-tax 
affiliates in order to support larger allocations of MNE profits to this group 
member.219 As discussed above, MNEs engaging in cloud computing can 
also benefit from structuring their legal arrangements in this manner. Be-
cause MNEs can easily create convenient intercompany contracts between 
different group members, these contracts are not a credible basis, in them-
selves, to justify the allocation of the MNE group’s residual profits to the 
risk-taker.220 Thus, the OECD’s proposal to treat contractual allocations of 
risk as only a starting point in the transfer pricing analysis and to increase 
the emphasis on the actual conduct of the parties will likely help align trans-
fer pricing outcomes with value creation.221 
Despite the foregoing, like numerous other situations that require a 
facts and circumstances analysis, this approach may increase the unpredict-
ability in how the transfer pricing rules are applied. Moreover, as the United 
States and other countries and commentators have noted, the OECD’s sug-
gestion that a “commercial rationality test” be adopted may result in turning 
longstanding transfer pricing principles into a series of vague concepts easi-
ly manipulated by countries to serve their revenue needs at the expense of 
other countries’ tax bases and MNEs.222 Thus, challenges remain even if 
these solutions are adopted. 
                                                                                                                           
to respect the transaction); Verlinden & Katz, supra note 194, at 7 (expressing concern that the 
commercial rationality test is inconsistent with the principles underlying the arm’s-length stand-
ard). 
 219 OECD, ACTION 1 ON TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 29, at 92. 
 220 Id.; Benshalom, supra note 105, at 435–36. 
 221 Specifically, the OECD report states: 
Establishing the conduct of the parties involves examination of all of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding how those enterprises interact with one another in their 
economic and commercial context to generate potential commercial value, how that 
interaction contributes to the rest of the value chain, and what the interaction in-
volves in terms of the precise identification of the functions each party actually per-
forms, the assets each party actually employs, and the risks each party actually as-
sumes and manages. 
OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 1, supra note 217, at 4. 
 222 See, e.g., Amanda Athanasiou & Lee A. Sheppard, OECD’s Draft on Transfer Pricing 
Goes Beyond Arm’s Length, TAX NOTES (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-
today/transfer-pricing/oecds-draft-transfer-pricing-goes-beyond-arms-length/2014/12/22/4627741 
(expressing concern over the OECD’s willingness to venture far beyond the arm’s-length princi-
ple); Verlinden & Katz, supra note 194, at 2 (expressing concern that OECD guidance may en-
courage tax authorities to request commercial rationality analysis even when such analyses is 
inappropriate). The “commercial rationality test” requires consideration of whether the actual 
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The BEPS Action Plan also has set forth other actions that may be 
more successful in aligning risk allocations with the underlying economic 
reality of the MNE’s operations. For instance, Action Item 13 involves the 
development of rules regarding documentation of transfer pricing, including 
the standardization of certain transfer pricing reports and the exchange of 
country-by-country reporting.223 The OECD report with respect to this ac-
tion item contains revised standards for transfer pricing documentation and 
a template for country-by-country reporting of revenues, profits, taxes paid, 
and certain measures of economic activity.224 This documentation will pro-
vide tax administrations with better information with which to assess trans-
fer pricing risk allocations, as well as to identify the existence of other prac-
tices that have the effect of artificially shifting substantial amounts of in-
come to low-tax jurisdictions. 225  Although the costs of compliance and 
safeguards to prevent abuse need to be taken into account in implementing 
these reporting requirements, by enhancing transparency for tax administra-
tions, this new documentation is a crucial element of successfully address-
ing the BEPS problem.226 
In conclusion, it is clear that the current transfer pricing rules are insuf-
ficient to overcome BEPS. Thus, by identifying and proposing recommen-
dations to address the many difficult issues related to BEPS, the OECD’s 
work with respect to the BEPS Action Plan is an important first step in de-
veloping a global action plan to revise the current international tax stand-
                                                                                                                           
arrangements differ from those that would have been adopted by independent parties behaving in a 
commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances. OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRIC-
ING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, supra note 100, at 39. “It is also a relevant pointer to 
consider whether the MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis since this may be 
an indicator that the transaction viewed in its entirety lacks the commercial rationality of arrange-
ments between unrelated parties.” Id. 
 223 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 23. 
 224  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND 
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING, ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT 9 (2015). 
 225 See id. at 9–10 (providing a three-tiered standardized approach to transfer pricing docu-
mentation). 
 226 See id. at 9. Potential areas for abuse of this reporting system include the risk that tax ad-
ministrations will use the reports to demand a percentage of profits based on formulary appor-
tionment of the MNE’s profits or demand profits based on what similar countries are receiving. 
See Alex M. Parker, Treasury Official: ‘Policing’ Needed for BEPS Global Reporting System, 23 
TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 724 (2014) (noting potential areas for abuse of the reporting 
system and describing proposed safeguards to prevent abuse of the reports, including a reporting 
system for taxpayers and penalties for tax authorities); David D. Stewart, BEPS Solutions Must Go 
Beyond Transfer Pricing Rules, Stack Says, TAX NOTES (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.taxnotes.com/
document/beps-solutions-must-go-beyond-transfer-pricing-rules-stack-says-0 (stressing the importance 
of instituting mechanisms to prevent abuse of the reports). 
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ards to address BEPS and restore taxation on stateless income.227 Ultimate-
ly, however, international reform that departs from the arm’s-length stand-
ard is needed to overcome the BEPS challenges. Because the BEPS project 
recommendations continue to rely to a large extent on the arm’s-length 
principle, which is largely consistent with the international community’s 
general desire to maintain this long-standing standard, the BEPS Action 
Plan will likely not be successful in minimizing BEPS either within or out-
side of the cloud context.228 
B. Formulary Apportionment 
Many commentators have recommended that successful international 
reform should include the adoption of a system of formulary apportionment 
for taxing the corporate income of MNEs on a multilateral basis.229 This 
section considers the merits of departing from the arm’s-length standard and 
using a formulary approach to address BEPS in the cloud context. It con-
cludes that, although not a perfect solution, a formulary approach would 
help resolve many BEPS issues in the context of cloud computing.230 
Under the formulary approach, an MNE is treated as a single taxpayer 
and its worldwide profits are allocated to a particular taxing jurisdiction 
based on a formula comprised of various factors.231 A system of formulary 
apportionment would therefore eliminate the current practice of separately 
accounting for the income earned in each tax jurisdiction in which an MNE 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 13, at 13–
14 (calling for “[n]ew international standards . . . to ensure the coherence of corporate income 
taxation at the international level”). 
 228  The OECD has also recognized that “incremental approaches may help curb current 
trends” but will not ultimately solve many of the BEPS challenges that governments face. OECD, 
ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 8. 
 229 See, e.g., KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING & REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, BROOKINGS INST., RE-
FORMING CORPORATE TAXATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT FORMULARY 
APPORTIONMENT 12 (2007) (proposing the United States move to a system of formulary appor-
tionment to help protect the U.S. tax base while reducing the distortionary features, complexity 
and administrative burdens of the current tax system). But see Fleming et al., supra note 124, at 2 
(arguing that formulary apportionment still gives rise to distortive effects and manipulation poten-
tial and therefore proposing the adoption of a real worldwide system of taxation is the preferred 
approach). 
 230 See infra notes 247–250 and accompanying text. 
 231 See CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 12 (proposing to adopt a formulary 
apportionment system where an MNE’s U.S. tax obligations would be based on a fraction of its 
worldwide income, the fraction being equal to the proportion of the firm’s total sales occurring in 
the United States); Michael Durst, Portfolio 6938-1st: A Formulary System for Dividing Income 
Among Taxing Jurisdictions, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX & ACCT. CTR. FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLI-
OS, § 5(D) (2015) (stating that the traditional three-factor approach which considers property, 
compensation, and sales revenue, should be the conceptual starting point for devising a formulary 
apportionment system). 
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operates.232 As a result, as with the profit split method, MNEs would not be 
able to artificially take residual profits related to cost savings and synergies 
it generates by centralizing IT operations in the cloud and shift them to af-
filiates in low-tax jurisdictions solely through the use of the transfer pricing 
rules. The transfer pricing rules would no longer be relevant under a formu-
lary apportionment approach. 
Moreover, use of formulary apportionment would help address the dif-
ficulties that MNEs currently face in trying to find comparable transactions 
between independent parties in order to determine an arm’s-length price for 
the intercompany transaction. A formulary approach eliminates the need to 
identify comparable unrelated party transactions and the need to determine 
an arm’s-length price. Instead, this approach departs from the arm’s-length 
standard and apportions income among related entities based on factors that 
focus on the MNE group’s observable economic activity in each location.233 
Therefore, formulary apportionment would minimize the significant uncer-
tainties and transaction costs that MNEs currently face in trying to deter-
mine the arm’s-length price for cloud transactions that have no easily identi-
fiable equivalent transaction.234 It would also reduce these uncertainties and 
costs for tax administrations trying to enforce the arm’s-length standard, 
especially as the cloud model continues to evolve.235 
Various commentators have suggested a variety of factors to be taken 
into account to apportion income among jurisdictions under the formulary 
approach.236 Factors often considered in apportioning an MNE’s worldwide 
income include assets, payroll and/or sales.237 These factors seek to serve as 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See Sheppard, supra note 124 (noting that treating affiliates as separate economic actors 
“giv[es] multinationals free reign to determine where their profits should be taxed, or more likely, 
not taxed”). 
 233 Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 120, at 511; see Kimberly A. Clausing, Beyond Territorial 
and Worldwide Systems of International Taxation, 15 J. INT’L FIN. & ECON. no. 2, June 2015, at 
43, 53 (identifying the essential advantage of the formulary approach as “provid[ing] a concrete 
way for determining the source of international income that is not sensitive to arbitrary features of 
corporate behavior”). 
 234 See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 120, at 512 (characterizing transfer pricing as “the most 
important international tax issue facing MNEs”). 
 235 See id. (noting that for the U.S. government, audit costs are between three to seven times 
higher for federal transfer pricing cases than for state formula apportionment audits). 
 236 E.g., CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 12; Durst, supra note 231, § 5(D). 
 237 For instance, some propose a system that would use a formula based on the destination of 
sales. E.g., CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 12. Others suggest a three-factor formu-
la, like the one formally used by most U.S. states, that would take into account sales, payroll, and 
assets. E.g., Durst, supra note 231, § 5(D) (stating that the traditional three-factor approach should 
be the conceptual starting point for devising a formulary apportionment system). A related ap-
proach that has been proposed is to employ a formulary profit split method. E.g., Avi-Yonah et al., 
supra note 120, at 498. Under this method, the tax base would be calculated as a normal rate of 
return on expenses, with residual profits allocated by a sales-based formula. Id.; Clausing, supra 
note 233, at 54. In other words, this method would allocate worldwide income based on two-
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a proxy for defining and measuring economic activity. But allocating an 
MNE’s profits on the basis of these types of factors does not sufficiently 
eliminate artificial tax incentives or the ability of an MNE to relocate its 
income to low-tax jurisdictions. 238 For instance, in the cloud computing 
context, an asset-based factor may create an inefficient allocation of capital. 
Specifically, cloud computing depends heavily on servers and other IT in-
frastructure, which are mobile assets that an MNE can locate anywhere in 
the world and whose location does not generally affect the pretax income 
the MNE generates from its cloud operations.239 Because the servers repre-
sent an economic activity that generates value, MNEs have a tax incentive 
to locate their servers in low-tax jurisdictions and allocate more income to 
those jurisdictions. The server’s location, however, does not necessarily 
signify the jurisdiction in which the income economically originated, which 
means that relying on the server location will not bring allocation of the 
worldwide income of an MNE group more directly in line with the location 
of the economic activity that gives rise to that income.240 
An asset-based factor also does not adequately account for the com-
mon placement of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions for load-
balancing, backup, and security purposes. Even though these types of serv-
ers may not contribute as much economic value as core servers, an asset-
based factor would likely allocate an equal amount of income to the juris-
dictions where the mirror servers reside, thereby distorting the allocation of 
income. Moreover, an asset-based apportionment factor does not sufficient-
ly address issues concerning the treatment of intangible property, which is 
often another significant value-driver in the cloud business model.241 The 
formulary approach continues to require a determination of where the in-
tangible property is located. But it remains unclear whether the intangible 
property is located at the location of the legal owner, the location of re-
search and development, the location of the capital that funded the devel-
opment of the asset, or the location of exploitation. Any formulary approach 
                                                                                                                           
factors: (i) a fixed imputed return on deductible business expenses, and (ii) sales. Avi-Yonah et 
al., supra note 120, at 498. 
 238 See Clausing, supra note 233, at 53 (noting that under a three-factor formula based on 
sales, assets, and payroll there is then an incentive to locate real economic activity in low-tax 
countries, which raises concerns regarding efficient capital allocation); Fleming et al., supra note 
124, at 35 (expressing concern over the incentive under the three-factor formulary to move assets 
and workers to low-tax foreign countries); CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 9–10, 12 
(noting that a system of formulary apportionment based on the three factors would still create 
artificial tax incentives). The experience of the states with formulary apportionment is further 
evidence of the challenges in finding factors that equitably apportion income among jurisdictions. 
 239 Mazur, supra note 1, at 60. 
 240 Id. 
 241 CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 12. 
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implemented that utilizes the asset factor would need to address these is-
sues. 
In addition, allocating income based on the location of payroll or labor 
also raises challenges in the cloud computing context. As discussed above, 
many cloud computing services can be provided without any people or very 
few people involved. Thus, the location of employees may not necessarily 
represent the location of the MNE’s value-drivers and allocating income on 
the basis of this factor may have distortive effects. The literature also sug-
gests that use of a payroll apportionment factor would likely incentivize 
MNEs to locate employees in low-tax jurisdictions.242 Because the cloud 
further facilitates the ability of employees to provide IT services remotely, 
this factor would likely also further influence an MNE’s decision of where 
to locate its workers. Furthermore, this factor does not adequately take into 
account that the current rules most likely characterize cloud computing 
transactions as the provision of services, rather than the transfer of tangible 
or intangible assets. As a result, a disproportionate amount of the MNE’s 
income may be allocated to the location of the employees as the typical 
providers of services. This type of allocation may cause taxation of an 
MNE’s profits to not align with economic activity. 
The third factor often considered either alone or in combination with 
the above factors in apportioning worldwide income is a sales-based factor. 
Although this factor also has its limitations, it is often considered superior 
to the other factors because the location of sales are often less influenced by 
tax considerations due to the fact that customers are generally less mobile 
than the MNE’s assets or personnel.243 Thus, formulary apportionment on 
the basis of sales would minimize or altogether eliminate the amount of in-
come allocated to the location of mobile assets, such as servers. It also bet-
ter addresses existing issues of how to allocate income generated by intan-
gible assets by allocating income to the location where the intangible prop-
                                                                                                                           
 242 See id. (characterizing the three-factor formulary apportionment approach as creating an 
implicit tax on the three factors, thus discouraging their use in high-tax jurisdictions); Fleming et 
al., supra note 124, at 35 (noting that a three-factor formulary approach may incentivize MNEs to 
move their workers to low-tax jurisdictions). 
 243 CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 12; see Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global 
Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 605–06 (2010) (“The inelasticity of sales fol-
lows from significant business incentives to increase sales to customers, which should minimize 
the importance of tax incentives to assign sales to different locations.”). In fact, U.S. states have 
increasingly adopted formulary apportionment formulas based solely on the destination of sales. 
Durst, supra note 231, § 2(B)(1). But note that taxpayers may try to distort the location of their 
sales by using independent distributing agents in low-tax jurisdictions for their sales. See 
CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 229, at 20 (noting, however, that the risk of distortion may 
be limited by the unwillingness of the taxpayer to relinquish control over marketing and distrib-
uting activities); Fleming et al., supra note 124, at 41–42 (exploring ways in which a MNE could 
manipulate the customer component and shift income to low-tax jurisdictions). 
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erty is used. This would eliminate the need to make the difficult determina-
tion of which entity or entities are the true economic owners of the asset. 
Moreover, in the cloud computing context, a sales factor that bases sales on 
the location of the customer may also better align taxation with the location 
of value creation because cloud-related income generally has an observable 
economic connection to the customer’s location.244 
A destination sales-based factor, however, also creates administrative 
and enforcement difficulties due to the nature of cloud computing. In par-
ticular, the location from which customers access an MNE’s cloud-based 
goods or services may change frequently and the location can be difficult 
for the MNE group, as well as tax administrations, to determine accurate-
ly.245 In addition, a sales-based factor would have to address how to allocate 
the income among the different jurisdictions in which the MNEs customers 
are located because some fixed-based measurements, such as seat licenses, 
head count, or users, may not reflect the true usage of the cloud computing 
services as accurately as volume-based measurements.246 A sales-based fac-
tor on its own also may not be the most equitable, because it focuses solely 
on the market jurisdiction, thereby failing to allocate tax revenues to the 
country of production. 
Despite these shortcoming, both a formulary apportionment approach 
and a profit split methodology approach would improve the current situa-
tion more than the current rules that rely on the arm’s-length standard. 
These approaches do not require an identification of comparable unrelated 
transactions, which is often difficult to do, nor do they require an analysis of 
the MNE group’s functions, risks, and assets, which is often subject to the 
MNE group’s control. The reliance on these features to determine an arm’s-
length price for intercompany transactions has largely contributed to the 
failure of these rules.247 Moreover, these approaches also eliminate the need 
for separate accounting, which has contributed to the proliferation of paper 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Mazur, supra note 1, at 61. 
 245 Id. at 28–29. Moreover, as one scholar notes, taxpayers can also obscure the location in 
which products or services are actually being consumed or used by routing sales destined for high-
tax countries through intermediaries in zero- or low-tax countries, which creates additional diffi-
culties in determining the destination of sales in today’s digitalized marketplace. Michael C. 
Durst, The Tax Policy Outlook for Developing Countries: Reflections on International Formulary 
Apportionment 12 (Int’l Ctr. For Tax. & Dev. Working Paper 32, Feb. 2015), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587860 [perma.cc/6JPE-QFG2]. The current permanent estab-
lishment rules also create difficulties because these rules generally do not treat the mere destina-
tion of sales as a basis for taxable nexus. Id. 
 246 See Welsh et al., supra note 29, at 152 (noting the difficulties involved in determining the 
appropriate metric to allocate costs through the services cost method). 
 247 See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 120, at 517 (asserting that the two elements that have 
caused the current regulations to fail are “reliance on ‘uncontrolled comparables’ and ‘functional 
analysis’ based on the taxpayer’s facts and circumstances”). 
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profits. As some commentators have noted, “while a truly precise definition 
and measurement of economic value is likely unattainable,” a formulary 
approach may provide a “reasonable, comparatively administrable, and 
conceptually satisfying compromise that suits the nature of the global econ-
omy.” 248  Significantly, because the arm’s-length standard has become a 
nearly worldwide standard for determining the transfer price between relat-
ed entities, these and any other proposals that depart from the arm’s-length 
method will need to overcome substantial political hurdles and may create 
more uncertainty for taxpayers.249 Moreover, for this approach to succeed in 
preventing double taxation, as well as eliminating non-taxation, multilateral 
coordination and implementation of this type of approach are essential to 
minimizing the discrepancies between the rules that permit BEPS.250 
CONCLUSION 
As MNEs move their business to the cloud, they face new challenges 
in trying to determine the arm’s-length price of their intercompany cloud 
computing transactions. The current international tax rules have not kept up 
with the changing business environment brought about by the evolution of 
technology, which has given rise to many difficulties in applying the trans-
fer pricing rules to intercompany cloud-based activities. Because of these 
difficulties, cloud computing will likely give rise to an increase in tax dis-
putes between MNEs and tax administrations. At the same time, the mobile 
and borderless nature of cloud computing, together with the uncertainties 
created by the current transfer pricing rules, will likely contribute to the cur-
rent BEPS problem by facilitating an MNE’s ability to artificially shift prof-
its to low-tax jurisdictions. The BEPS Action Plan, which attempts to en-
compass a multilateral solution, is a step in the right direction, but will like-
ly fail to eliminate BEPS. Instead, the new economy requires innovative 
solutions that involve international coordination and cooperation and depart 
from the arm’s-length standard.251 Thus, as argued in this Article, the global 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Id. at 511. 
 249 See Verlinden & Katz, supra note 194, at 1 (noting that the OECD discussion draft on the 
use of profit splits in the context of global value chains “cover many of the most controversial 
areas of transfer pricing and pose many questions with differing, reasonable (and sometimes con-
tradictory) opinions as to how to best approach them”). 
 250 See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 6–8, 28, 
39 (stressing the importance of developing a uniform tax policy to prevent hybrid mismatch ar-
rangements); Brauner, supra note 12, at 79–80 (noting how different countries employing differ-
ent tax rules to similar circumstances can lead to double non-taxation); CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, 
supra note 229, at 19 (identifying the prevention of double taxation and non-taxation as goals of 
the formulary apportionment approach). 
 251 See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 8, at 8 (em-
phasizing the importance of “revisit[ing] some of the fundamentals of the existing standards” 
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adoption of a system of formulary apportionment or the profit-split method-
ology is necessary to resolve many BEPS issues in the context of cloud 
computing. Unfortunately, because an international solution that departs 
from the arm’s-length standard is not likely to occur anytime soon, the 
BEPS problem is likely to remain. 
                                                                                                                           
when creating a comprehensive action plan to address BEPS); Brauner, supra note 12, at 72 
(stressing the necessity of innovation solutions to address BEPS); Jones, supra note 29, at 21 (as-
serting that a plan that effectively addresses BEPS must be “coordinated, concerted and compre-
hensive”). 
   
 
